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INTRODUCTION 
The East African Court of Justice (EACJ) was inaugurated in 2001 
following its establishment as the judicial organ of the East African 
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Community (EAC).1  A primary objective of the EAC is to establish a 
customs union, a common market, a monetary union, and ultimately a 
political federation.2  In 2005, the EAC became a customs union, and in 
2010 it became a common market.3  Rwanda and Burundi became 
members of the EAC ten years after its establishment.4  Therefore, 
including the original members (Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania), the East 
African Community has five members. 
When the EAC was founded, its executive organs did not contemplate 
an active role for the EACJ in the regional integration process, much less 
so with respect to human rights.5  As a result, they did not adequately fund 
the court in its initial years—or subsequently—or give much attention to 
establishing it as an independent judicial organ.6 
Notwithstanding these challenges, the EACJ exemplifies a new trend 
in African regional human rights enforcement.  Rather than serving as a 
tribunal to resolve trade disputes, as envisaged by its original designers, the 
court has evolved into one that seeks to hold member governments 
accountable for violations of human rights and to promote good 
governance and the rule of law.  Like its counterparts the Economic 
Community of West Africa Court of Justice (ECCJ) and the now-
suspended Southern African Development Community (SADC) Tribunal, 
the EACJ has become an important human rights court.  The human rights 
jurisprudence that these courts have produced so far stands in sharp 
contrast to the general reluctance of national courts in EAC member states 
 
 1.  John Eudes Ruhangisa, Role of the East African Court of Justice in the Realization of 
Customs Union and Common Market 2–3 (paper presented at the Inter-Parliamentary Relations 
Seminar, Burundi National Assembly, Bujumbura, Burundi, Jan. 27–31, 2010), available at 
http://www.eac.int/news/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=90&Itemid=78.  The 
EAC was reestablished in 2000 following the ratification of the Treaty for the Establishment of the East 
African Community.  About the Treaty, E. AFR. COMMUNITY, http://www.eac.int/treaty/ (last updated 
Aug. 20, 2007).  The original EAC was disbanded in 1977 following major differences among the three 
original members: Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania.  See JAMES THUO GATHII, AFRICAN REGIONAL 
TRADE AGREEMENTS AS LEGAL REGIMES 43, 181, 268 (2011). 
 2.  GATHII, supra note 1, at 181–202. 
 3.  Id. at 182. 
 4.  Id. at 181. 
 5.  See, e.g., East African Legislative Assembly [EALA], Official Report of the Proceedings of 
the East African Legislative Assembly, 59th Sitting, 1st Assemb., 1st Meeting, 5th Sess. 17–18 (Dec. 6, 
2005), available at http://www.eala.org/key-documents/doc_details/70-6-december-2005.html (quoting 
the EAC Legal Counsel discouraging EALA members from invoking the EACJ’s jurisdiction to issue 
an advisory opinion on the powers of the executive organs of the EAC relative to those of the EALA). 
 6.  E. AFRICAN COURT OF JUSTICE, STRATEGIC PLAN: 2010–2015, at 14 (2010) [hereinafter 
EACJ STRATEGIC PLAN], available at http://eacj.huriweb.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/EACJ_ 
StrategicPlan_2010-2015.pdf (noting that the EACJ faces “crippling challenges,” including “budgetary 
constraints” and “undetermined terms and conditions of service for Judges”). 
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to enforce human rights guarantees.7  Remarkably, these courts have 
construed their powers broadly to allow them to decide human rights cases 
even though their respective constitutive treaties—in the case of both the 
EACJ and the SADC Tribunal—do not include a specific grant of 
jurisdiction to entertain human rights cases.8 
The EACJ’s growing human rights case law is part of a new form of 
rights-based legal mobilization that must be seen in the shifting normative 
context in which trade agreements include human rights in their preambles.  
This mobilization by lawyers, legal groups, and political actors has allowed 
courts to become new forums for political struggle and the vindication of 
rights claims.9  In addition, the judges have engaged in a strategy to gain, 
promote, and then protect their institutional power.  The EACJ has 
capitalized on this shifting context and in the process has redefined its role 
as conceived in the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African 
Community.  The court has decided important human rights cases, 
including a case involving the military arrest and detention of fourteen 
individuals after they had been granted bail by the High Court of Uganda; 
the failure to investigate over 3,000 cases of murder, torture, cruelty, and 
inhumane or degrading treatment committed by security forces against the 
government of Kenya; and incommunicado detention by the government of 
Rwanda. 
The EAC member states, however, perceive the EACJ’s self-
proclaimed human rights jurisdiction as a subversion of their sovereignty.  
 
 7.  See Yash Ghai, The Kenyan Bill of Rights: Theory and Practice, in PROMOTING HUMAN 
RIGHTS THROUGH BILLS OF RIGHTS: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 187 (Philip Alston ed., 1999) 
(discussing the challenges relating to the enforcement of the Bill of Rights in Kenya); Joe Oloka-
Onyango, Judicial Power and Constitutionalism in Uganda: A Historical Perspective, in UGANDA: 
STUDIES IN LIVING CONDITIONS, POPULAR MOVEMENTS, AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 463 (Mahmood 
Mamdani & Joe Oloka-Onyango eds., 1994) (discussing the limitations of judicial review of executive 
conduct relating to human rights in Uganda); Chris Maina Peter, Five Years of the Bill of Rights in 
Tanzania: Drawing a Balance-Sheet, 4 AFR. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 131, 131 (1992) (stating that, in 
Tanzania, “[t]he inclusion of the Bill of Rights into the Constitution was basically against the will of the 
State”). 
 8.  See Protocol on Tribunal in the Southern African Development Community arts. 14–15, Aug. 
7, 2000, available at http://www.sadc.int/files/1413/5292/8369/Protocol_on_the_Tribunal_and_Rules_ 
thereof2000.pdf; Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community art. 27(1), Nov. 30, 1999, 
2144 U.N.T.S. 255 [hereinafter EAC Treaty] (“The Court shall initially have jurisdiction over the 
interpretation and application of this Treaty . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. art. 27(2) (“The Court shall 
have such other original, appellate, human rights and other jurisdiction as will be determined by the 
Council at a suitable subsequent date.  To this end, the Partner States shall conclude a protocol to 
operationalise the extended jurisdiction”); infra Part I.B (discussing the Sebalu lawsuit in the context of 
the failure to operationalize Article 27(2)). 
 9.  Of course, these courts also provide an additional route for political players to resolve their 
conflicts. 
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They believe that the court’s human rights decisions are creating new 
understandings of legality to which the states do not subscribe at home.  
These states are resisting allowing the court to conform their domestic 
affairs to international understandings of legality.  In short, EAC states did 
not sign EAC treaties as evidence of their commitments to respect human 
rights; the EACJ is dragging them kicking and screaming towards keeping 
those commitments. 
This paper argues that the remarkable rise of human rights case law in 
the EACJ represents a significant instance of building and forging judicial 
autonomy that derives from the entrepreneurship, resourcefulness, and 
creativity of the judges on the court and of the court’s long-standing 
registrar.10  This was achieved in large part through court efforts to forge a 
broad network of lawyers and civil society groups based in Arusha, 
Tanzania, and throughout East Africa, with support from civil society 
groups across Africa and beyond and from their Western donors.11  In 
addition, well-organized civil society groups, such as the East African Law 
Society, its constituent members, and the national bar associations of each 
EAC member State, supported this turn every step of the way.  Thus, to 
understand the EACJ’s turn to human rights litigation, one has to examine 
how several key constituencies shaped the context within which the EACJ 
came to hold that it had “jurisdiction not to abdicate” from the protection of 
human rights,12 which it assumed even though the executive organs of the 
EAC would have preferred otherwise. 
Why did the EACJ ignore the formal restrictions on its jurisdiction 
(and the informal ones, such as funding limits)?  Why did it resort to elastic 
interpretive methodologies to advance the protection and promotion of 
human rights in its case law?  The literature on delegation to international 
courts has responded to such queries in at least five ways.  First, by 
conceptualizing ICs as Agents and states as their Principals (P-A theory); 
second, by arguing that ICs are Trustees; third, by demonstrating how ICs 
alter politics (the Altered Politics framework); fourth, by advancing a 
theory of constrained independence; and fifth, by advancing a theory of 
bounded discretion.  Part III of this Article extensively discusses each of 
 
 10.  See EAC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 45(4) (“[T]he Registrar shall be responsible to the 
President of the Court for the day to day administration of the business of the Court.  The Registrar 
shall also carry out the duties imposed upon him by this Treaty and rules of the Court.”). 
 11.  See Makau Mutua, Human Rights NGOs in East Africa: Defining the Challenges, in HUMAN 
RIGHTS NGOS IN EAST AFRICA: POLITICAL AND NORMATIVE TENSIONS 13, 19–20 (Makau Mutua ed., 
2009) (criticizing these groups for their dependency on Western funding and methodologies). 
 12.  Katabazi v. Sec’y Gen. of the E. African Cmty., Ref. No. 1 of 2007, at 1–2 (Nov. 1, 2007), 
available at http://eacj.huriweb.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/NO._1_OF_2007.pdf. 
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these approaches and explores the extent to which they explain the EACJ’s 
resort to teleological or purposive interpretive methodologies to decide 
human rights cases.  While each of these approaches provide insights that 
help to explain the EACJ’s human rights decisions, none of them fully fit 
the EACJ’s experience, as the conditions for the application of each are not 
always present in Africa. 
To set the context for the rest of the paper, Part I examines the EACJ’s 
human rights case law.  Part II examines the reasons accounting for the rise 
of this case law.  Part III examines what the EACJ experience says about 
contemporary theories of delegation to international courts, none of which 
fit the developing country experience, in particular the regional economic 
courts in Africa.  Existing theories of delegation have little or nothing to 
say about how regional courts in developing countries with poorly 
functioning political systems and executives and legislatures that have little 
to no legitimacy have assumed broad powers.  To the extent that the 
conditions for the application of contemporary theories of delegation do not 
exist in developing countries, there is a huge theoretical gap in the 
delegation literature. 
I. THE HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE OF THE EACJ 
In assuming jurisdiction over human rights cases, the EACJ has 
effectively arrogated to itself the power to establish the validity of the 
conduct of member states in this newly constitutionalized regional human 
rights regime.  It has exercised jurisdiction over human rights 
notwithstanding the Council of Ministers’ failure to formally extend such 
jurisdiction to it, a move that the Council has been considering since 2004.  
Hence, rather than wait for such formal conferral, the court has interpreted 
its jurisdiction to include human rights cases.  As such, its human rights 
case law goes far beyond the scope that the Treaty explicitly contemplated.  
The court’s human rights jurisprudence also stands in contrast to the plan to 
make the court the legal engine for creating a common market.13  Although 
the EAC has been a customs union since 2005 and a common market since 
2010, the court has not been used to resolve any customs or common 
market questions.14  In fact, the protocols establishing the customs union 
 
 13.  Cf. James McCall Smith, The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design: Explaining Legalism in 
Regional Trade Pacts, 54 INT’L ORG. 137, 147–50 (2000) (arguing that dispute settlement mechanisms 
in regional integration schemes are intended to reassure private investors but that regional integration 
arrangements between partners of unequal economic size and bargaining leverage often fail to create 
such mechanisms). 
 14.  The exception is an advisory opinion that clarified the relationship between “variable 
geometry” and consensus decisionmaking.  See In re A Request by the Council of Ministers of the East 
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and common market grant jurisdiction to alternative bodies, effectively 
denying the court jurisdiction to decide controversies over any customs or 
common market rules.15  This Part examines the court’s human rights 
cases, beginning with the 2007 Katabazi case.  These cases exemplify the 
court’s activism. 
A. The Katabazi Case 
On November 16, 2005, Ugandan “security personnel” rearrested 
fourteen Ugandans who had just been granted bail by the High Court.16  
These events have been described as “the worst attack on judicial 
independence through the siege of the High Court.”17  Not only did the 
security personnel interfere with the preparation of the bail papers, they 
also took the arrestees before a military general court-martial, where they 
were charged with unlawful possession of firearms and terrorism under the 
same facts that had supported the previous charges, for which they had 
been granted bail.18  The Ugandan Constitutional Court, on petition from 
the Uganda Law Society, declared the detentions unconstitutional and 
 
African Community for an Advisory Opinion, Appl. No. 1 of 2008 (First Instance Div., 2009), 
available at http://eacj.huriweb.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/advisory_opinion_1_of_2008.pdf.  
Variable geometry, in the African context, means “rules, principles and policies adopted in trade 
integration treaties that give Member States, particularly the poorest members: (i) policy flexibility and 
autonomy to pursue at slower paces timetabled commitments and harmonization objectives; (ii) 
mechanisms to minimize distributional losses by creating opportunities such as compensation for losses 
arising from implementation of region-wide liberalization commitments and policies aimed at the 
equitable distribution of the institutions and organizations of regional integration to avoid concentration 
in any one member; and (iii) preferences in industrial allocation among members in an RTA and 
preferences in the allocation of credit and investments from regional banks.”  GATHII, supra note 1, at 
35. 
 15.  See Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Community Common Market art. 
54(2), Nov. 20, 2009, available at http://www.eac.int/index.php?option=com_docman&Itemid=226 
(follow “EAC Protocols Update” hyperlink); Protocol on the Establishment of the East African 
Community Customs Union art. 24(1)(e), Mar. 2, 2004, available at http://www.eac.int/index.php? 
option=com_docman&Itemid=226 (follow “EAC Protocols Update” hyperlink).  In East African Centre 
for Trade Policy and Law v. Secretary General of the East African Community, Ref. No. 9 of 2012 
(First Instance Div. May 9, 2013), available at http://eacj.huriweb.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/FI_ 
EACommunity-EACTPL.pdf, the court decided that these provisions were not inconsistent with its 
jurisdiction and supremacy over the interpretation of all EAC treaties.  Id. at 33–35.  The East African 
Law Society has filed a suit challenging the legality of sidestepping the EACJ.  Press Release, E. 
African Court of Justice, EALS Asks Court to Nullify Protocol Provisions on Dispute Settlement (May 
4, 2012), available at http://eacj.org/?p=413. 
 16.  Katabazi, Ref. No. 1 of 2007, at 1–2.  The case incorrectly lists this date as November 16, 
2006.  See KITUO CHA KATIBA: E. AFR. CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL DEV., FIVE-YEAR STRATEGIC 
PLAN 2011–2016, at 10 (2011) (listing the correct date). 
 17.  KITUO CHA KATIBA: E. AFR. CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL DEV., supra note 16, at 10. 
 18.  Katabazi, Ref. No. 1 of 2007, at 2. 
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ordered the individuals released from detention.19  The Ugandan 
government failed to comply with that decision, and a complaint was 
thereafter filed in the EACJ.20  The complainants challenged their rearrest, 
military charges, and detention as inconsistent with the provisions of the 
Treaty.21  They argued that this conduct, together with the refusal by the 
Ugandan government to comply with the bail order, constituted an 
infringement of Articles 5(1), 6, 7(2), and 8(1)(c) of the Treaty.22  The 
respondents, the Secretary-General of the East African Community and the 
Attorney General of Uganda, challenged the EACJ’s jurisdiction to deal 
with matters of human rights, arguing that the Council had not yet extended 
that jurisdiction as contemplated under Article 27(2) of the Treaty.23 
Article 5(1) of the Treaty provides that “the objectives of the 
Community shall be to develop policies and programmes aimed at 
widening and deepening co-operation among the Partner States in 
political, social and cultural fields, research and technology, defence, 
security and legal and judicial affairs.”24  Article 6 provides that the 
objectives of the Community include the promotion of human and peoples’ 
rights in accordance with the provisions of the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights.25  Article 7(2) provides that the “principles of good 
governance, including adherence to the principles of democracy, the rule of 
law, social justice and the maintenance of universally accepted standards 
of human rights” are operational principles of the EAC.26  Furthermore, 
Article 8(1)(c) obliges EAC partner states to “abstain from any measures 
likely to jeopardize the achievement of those objectives or the 
implementation of the provisions of this Treaty.”27Although the EACJ 
noted that it did not have jurisdiction to decide human rights cases, it 
nevertheless held that it could decide such cases.28  Specifically, the EACJ 
determined that “[w]hile the Court will not assume jurisdiction to 
adjudicate on human rights disputes, it will not abdicate from exercising its 
jurisdiction of interpretation under Article 27(1) merely because the 
reference includes allegation[s] of human rights violation[s].”29  In other 
 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. at 2–3. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. at 3. 
 23.  Id. at 12–14. 
 24.  EAC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 5(1). 
 25.  Id. art. 6. 
 26.  Id. art. 7(2). 
 27.  Id. art. 8(1)(c). 
 28.  Katabazi, Ref. No. 1 of 2007, at 14–16. 
 29.  Id. at 16. 
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words, the EACJ held that it could not abdicate its responsibility to 
interpret the provisions of the Treaty, including those relating to the rule of 
law, human rights, and democracy.  Moreover, it noted that Article 23 
provides that the EACJ “shall ensure the adherence to law.”30  Thus, the 
Court held that it has Article 27(1) jurisdiction to exercise its powers under 
Article 23.  Citing cases from the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights and from the United Kingdom, the court held that it had an 
obligation to “provide a check on the exercise of the responsibility . . . to 
protect the rule of law.”31  The Court then determined that Articles 5(1), 6, 
7(2), and 8(1)(c) require Partner States to abide by the decisions of their 
courts.32  It held, 
 
[T]he intervention by the armed security agents of Uganda to prevent the 
execution of a lawful Court order violated the principle of the rule of law 
and consequently contravened the Treaty.  Abiding by the court decision 
is the corner stone of the independence of the judiciary which is one of 
the principles of the observation of the rule of law.33 
 
The court held that to accept Uganda’s defense that the rearrest and 
detention of the complainants had been necessary for security reasons 
“would lead to an unacceptable and dangerous precedent, which would 
undermine the rule of law.”34 
B. Post-Katabazi Human Rights Cases 
Rugumba v. Secretary General of the East African Community was 
brought on behalf of a Rwandan citizen who had been held incommunicado 
without trial for five months.35  The Rwandan government objected to 
jurisdiction.36  The claimant argued that Rwanda had violated the Treaty 
provisions relating to good governance, the rule of law, and human rights.37  
The court asserted its jurisdiction to ensure that Partner States adhere to the 
principles of good governance and the rule of law.38  The court held that to 
not determine whether Rwanda had violated Articles 6(d) and 7(2) of the 
 
 30.  Id. at 23 (quoting EAC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 23). 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. at 15–23. 
 33.  Id. at 23. 
 34.  Id. at 22. 
 35.  Ref. No. 8 of 2010, ¶ 2 (First Instance Div. Dec. 1, 2011), available at http://eacj.huriweb. 
org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Plaxeda-Rugumba-2010-8-judgment-2011.pdf. 
 36.  Id. ¶ 13. 
 37.  Id. ¶ 8. 
 38.  Id. ¶ 23. 
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Treaty would be a dereliction of its duty under Article 27(1) of the Treaty.39  
The court also rejected Rwanda’s argument that the claimant had not 
exhausted domestic remedies and therefore was not properly before the 
court.40  While the court could not issue an order for the Rwandan’s 
release, it nevertheless held that his incommunicado detention without trial 
was contrary to Articles 6(d) and 7(2) of the Treaty.41  The court also 
invoked provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
referred to in Article 7(2) of the Treaty, and asserted that these provisions 
were not decorative or cosmetic parts of the Treaty but were “meant to bind 
Partner States.”42  The court declined to hold that exhaustion of the 
Treaty’s statute of limitations was a bar to bringing the suit.43 
In Independent Medical Legal Unit v. Attorney General of Kenya,44 
the EACJ entertained yet another case that tested the argument that the 
court did not have jurisdiction over human rights.  This time, the case 
related to allegations of executions, torture, cruelty, and inhuman and 
degrading treatment committed by agents of the Government of Kenya in 
the Mount Elgon area.45  The plaintiff was a non-governmental 
organization that investigates human rights violations using forensic 
evidence.46  As has become the tradition in these human rights cases, the 
Kenyan government brought an unsuccessful challenge to the jurisdiction 
of the court.47  The court reiterated that even though it does not have human 
rights jurisdiction under Article 27(2), it has jurisdiction to interpret the 
Treaty.48  Hence, as long as allegations brought before the court involve an 
 
 39.  Id.  The Court further noted that it could not “stand idly by and declare itself to be impotent of 
the capacity to render itself forcefully where the rule of law is threatened in its eyes and in the eyes of 
the Treaty.”  Id. ¶ 41. 
 40.  Id. ¶ 30–31. 
 41.  Id. ¶ 36–37. 
 42.  Id. ¶ 37. 
 43.  Id. ¶ 28 (reasoning that a mathematical computation of time in a criminal case in which the 
conduct complained of was a chain of continuous events would be inappropriate); cf. Ariviza v. 
Attorney Gen. of Kenya, Appl. No. 3 of 2010, at 10 (Dec. 1, 2010), arising from Ref. No. 7 of 2010, 
available at http://eacj.huriweb.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/RULING-OF-1ST-DECEMBER-
2010.pdf (holding that internal law cannot be invoked to justify a violation of the Treaty). 
 44.  Ref. No. 3 of 2010 (First Instance Div. June 29, 2011), available at http://eacj.huriweb.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/2012/11/3-of-20101.pdf.  The First Instance Division’s opinion incorrectly lists the 
applicant as the Independent Medical Unit.  See Attorney Gen. of Kenya v. Indep. Med. Legal Unit, 
App. No. 1 of 2011 (App. Div. Mar. 15, 2012), available at http://eacj.huriweb.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2012/11/appeal-no-1-of-20112.pdf. 
 45.  Ref. No. 3 of 2010, at 2. 
 46.  See INDEPENDENT MEDICO-LEGAL UNIT, http://www.commonwealthhealth.org/partner/ 
independent-medico-legal-unit/. 
 47.  Ref. No. 3 of 2010, at 3–4. 
 48.  Id. at 5–6. 
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interpretation of the Treaty, their relation to violations of human rights does 
not preclude jurisdiction.49  The court noted that the only limitation to its 
jurisdiction was that a suit against officers of a partner state—other than the 
Attorney General—is not permissible.50 
In Sebalu v. Secretary General of the East African Community,51 the 
court took its biggest step yet towards securing its position in the EAC.  An 
applicant had lost judicial challenges to an electoral result in the Ugandan 
Supreme Court.52  He brought suit against the Ugandan government in the 
EACJ, arguing that the failure of the Council to extend the jurisdiction of 
the court since May 2004, when a Draft Protocol to Operationalize the 
Extended Jurisdiction of the EACJ was written, was an infringement of 
Articles 6, 7(2), and 8(1)(c) of the Treaty.53  Additionally, the applicant 
argued that Uganda’s failure to make written comments on the Draft 
Protocol also constituted an infringement of the Treaty, since the people of 
Uganda could not enjoy the full rights of good governance, democracy, the 
rule of law, and human rights.54  The court held that the delay in extending 
its appellate jurisdiction contravened the fundamental principles of good 
governance embodied in Article 6 of the Treaty.55  The court also noted that 
the failure to extend its jurisdiction implied that this function was 
exclusively the concern of the executive organs of the EAC.56  Affirming 
that the era of unaccountable governance had passed, the court held that 
holding officers accountable is required by Article 6(d) of the Treaty.57  An 
attempt to appeal the First Division’s decision was dismissed for not being 
timely filed.58 
The remarkable scope of the EACJ’s jurisdiction to interpret the 
lawfulness of a partner state’s conduct under the Treaty has resulted in suits 
challenging the construction of a highway through the scenic Serengeti 
 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  See id. at 7 (striking several Kenyan government officers off the suit and holding that the 
correct respondent was the Attorney General of Kenya). 
 51.  Ref. No. 1 of 2010 (First Instance Div. June 30, 2011), available at http://eacj.huriweb.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/2012/11/No-1-of-2010.pdf. 
 52.  Id. at 4. 
 53.  Id. at 4–5. 
 54.  Id. at 12. 
 55.  Id. at 42. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Sec’y Gen. of the E. African Cmty. v. Sebalu, Appl. No. 9 of 2012, at 18 (First Instance Div. 
Feb. 14, 2013), arising from Ref. No. 1 of 2010, available at http://eacj.huriweb.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2013/09/Application-No-9-of-2012-SG-Sebalu.pdf. 
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National Park in Tanzania,59 a suit challenging the rendition of a terrorist 
suspect from one partner state to another and subsequent detention without 
trial,60 and a suit challenging the implementation of a Referendum Law in 
Kenya (although the court ultimately dismissed that case on the merits).61  
The only constraints that the court has placed upon the scope of its 
jurisdiction are that it refuses to hear cases brought by litigants engaged in 
forum shopping: bringing before the court proceedings on commercial 
matters that raise substantially the same matters between the same parties 
as a case that is pending in the national courts of a partner state.62 
II. EXPLAINING THE RISE OF THE EACJ’S HUMAN RIGHTS 
JURISPRUDENCE 
The rise of the EACJ’s human rights case law has been a major part of 
the strategy of its judges and its registrar to escape the court’s initial 
obscurity within the EAC and to overcome its severe institutional 
weaknesses.  The court’s human rights jurisprudence stands somewhat 
paradoxically alongside its institutional weaknesses, which include the ad 
hoc basis on which most of its judges serve63 and the failure to settle their 
terms of service, the lack of a permanent location and building, insufficient 
staff, and an inadequate budget to pay for its operations.64  A lack of 
appreciation of the court’s role by the EAC’s executive organs is also a 
 
 59.  African Network for Animal Welfare v. Attorney Gen. of Tanz. (Serengeti), Ref. No. 9 of 
2010 (First Instance Div. Aug. 29, 2011), aff’d App. No. 3 of 2011 (App. Div. Mar. 15, 2012), available 
at http://eacj.huriweb.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Final-Ruling-ANAW-vs-AG-TZ-2011.pdf. 
 60.  Omar v. Attorney Gen. of Kenya, Appl. No. 4 of 2011 (First Instance Div. Dec. 1, 2011), 
arising from Ref. No. 4 of 2011, rev’d on other grounds, App. No. 2 of 2012 (App. Div. Apr. 15, 2013), 
available at http://eacj.huriweb.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Omar-Awadh-Omar-Vs-AG-Kenya. 
pdf. 
 61.  Ariviza v. Attorney Gen. of Kenya, Appl. No. 3 of 2010, at 5 (Dec. 1, 2010), arising from 
Ref. No. 7 of 2010, available at http://eacj.huriweb.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/RULING-OF-
1ST-DECEMBER-2010.pdf. 
 62.  See Alcon Int’l Ltd. v. Standard Chartered Bank of Uganda, Ref. No. 6 of 2010, at 8 (First 
Instance Div. 2011), rev’d, App. No. 2 of 2011 (Mar. 16, 2012), rev’d on other grounds, Ref. No. 6 of 
2010 (First Instance Div. Sept. 2, 2013), available at http://eacj.huriweb.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/ 
11/Alcon-International-2010-6-judgment-2011.pdf. 
 63.  Press Release, E. African Court of Justice, EACJ Judge President, Principal Judge Now Full-
Time in Arusha (July 2, 2012), available at http://eacj.org/?p=397.  Since July 2012, the Principal 
Judge of the First Instance Division and the President of the Appellate Division have been permanently 
located to Arusha, Tanzania.  Id.  The court also sits for longer sessions when it meets in its quarterly 
sessions.  For example, in November 2013, it had a month-long sitting.  Press Release, E. African 
Cmty., EACJ 4th Quarter Sessions to Resume This Week (Nov. 4, 2013), available at 
http://www.eac.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1401:eacj-4th-quarter-sessions-
to-resume-this-week&catid=146:press-releases&Itemid=194. 
 64.  EACJ STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 6, at 14. 
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significant challenge.65 
The judges and registrar have engaged in earnest efforts to develop, 
cultivate, build, and justify the EACJ’s relevance and its place within the 
EAC’s integration agenda: in essence, building its political legitimacy.  In 
doing so, the judges and registrar of the court have grounded themselves 
within a powerful network of lawyer associations and pro-democracy civil 
society groups.  This network has been decisive in the court’s foray into 
deciding human rights cases despite its lack of a mandate and the continued 
refusal by the EAC’s executive organs to extend that jurisdiction.66  The 
court’s new legitimacy largely explains why the court’s powerful human 
rights jurisprudence has not been entirely eliminated through “recontracting 
politics” (i.e., a disbandment of the court).67  This sharply contrasts with the 
backlash that the SADC Tribunal faced following its suspension in August 
2012.68  Arguably, the SADC Tribunal did not root itself in a network of 
powerful constituents and was therefore more vulnerable to recontracting 
politics.69 
The EACJ’s independence and activism has come at a moment when 
many African governments are beginning to develop their capabilities to 
 
 65.  The EACJ’s mid-term review of its 2010–2015 Strategic Plan at the end of October 2012 was 
the first time the entire staff of the EACJ met together.  A primary theme of the review was developing 
the best methods for improving the court’s design and its “appreciation, visibility and capacity.”  EACJ 
Conducts Midterm Review of its 5-Year Strategic Plan, EACJ E-NEWSL. (E. African Court of Justice, 
Arusha, Tanzania), Dec. 1, 2012, at 3, available at http://www.gghrp.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/ 
EACJ-e-Newsletter-December-2012.pdf.  An end of year review session on the court’s development 
was held at the end of the Fourth Quarterly Session in November 2013.  EACJ 4th Quarter Sessions to 
Resume This Week, supra note 63. 
 66.  Cf. DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: REPUTATIONS, 
NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES 1862–1928 (2001) (analyzing how the 
forging of networks that supported a federal agency’s mission were crucial to the success of that 
agency). 
 67.  Karen J. Alter, Agents or Trustees? International Courts in Their Political Context, 14 EUR. J. 
INT’L REL. 33, 35 (2008); see also infra Part III.A (discussing recontracting politics in the context of 
Principal Agent theory).  This jurisprudence is powerful in the sense that it has effectively challenged 
the conduct of the executive branches of the EAC member states without the traditional reticence that 
national courts in these countries often display when invited to decide cases involving human rights 
abuses, particularly those perceived to involve state security, e.g., Katabazi v. Sec’y Gen. of the E. 
African Cmty., Ref. No. 1 of 2007 (Nov. 1, 2007), available at http://eacj.huriweb.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2012/11/NO._1_OF_2007.pdf, or other executive prerogatives, e.g., Nyong’o v. Attorney Gen. 
of Kenya (Nyong’o III), Ref. No 1 of 2006 (Mar. 30, 2007), available at http://eacj.huriweb.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/11/EACJ_Reference_No_1_2006.pdf (involving the appointment of legislators to 
the East African Legislative Assembly). 
 68.  Erika de Wet, The Rise and Fall of the Tribunal of the Southern African Development 
Community: Implications for Dispute Settlement in Southern Africa, 28 ICSID Rev. 45, 47 (2013). 
 69.  This hypothesis is based on preliminary research.  It needs an in-depth examination, a project 
that the author began pursuing in 2013 with Professors Karen Alter and Lawrence Helfer. 
GATHII MACRO(DO NOT DELETE) 6/30/2014  3:29 PM 
2013] MISSION CREEP OR A SEARCH FOR RELEVANCE 261 
plan, innovate, and author policy in the human rights field.70  Although 
African governments and regional courts are still in the nascent phase of 
developing this capacity, African civil society organizations have built it up 
and have been earnestly seeking to influence these governments and 
regional courts.71 
The place of human rights, the rule of law, and democracy within the 
EAC governments is still in its formative stage.72  For the most part, the 
executive organs of the EAC would prefer that the EACJ play a larger role 
with respect to trade, investment, and economic integration and play no 
role in deciding human rights cases.73  This narrow vision of regional 
integration has been challenged since the early years of the EAC, 
particularly by the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) and civil 
society groups and eventually by the EACJ’s important human rights case 
law.  As one member of the East African Legislative Assembly argued in 
2002: 
 
We will take our duties seriously, we will be aware of where we are in 
the different countries in devolving the new responsibility for our own 
development, not only for our own transformation, but also for the 
respect of the rule of law and the observance of Human Rights.74 
 
 
 70.  See, e.g., RWANDA NAT’L COMM’N FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT OF CONFERENCE OF 
NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS IN THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY 5 (2009), available at 
http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_18294-1522-2-30.pdf (creating an association of the human rights 
institutions in each of the EAC partner states). 
 71.  For example, NGOs and law societies played an important role in how the ECOWAS Court 
of Justice came to acquire a human rights jurisdiction.  See Karen Alter, Laurence R. Helfer & 
Jacqueline R. McAllister, A New International Human Rights Court for West Africa: The ECOWAS 
Community Court of Justice, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 737 (2013). 
 72.  See EAC Leaders Establish East African Peace and Security Council, XINHUA AFRICAN 
NEWS (Nov. 30, 2011, 22:25), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/africa/2013-11/30/c_132931222.htm.  
The EAC peace and security framework includes the protection of human rights.  See EAC Peace & 
Security Strategy Overview, E. AFR. CMTY., http://www.eac.int/security/index.php?option=com_ 
content&view=article&id=67&Itemid=143 (last visited May 16, 2014). 
 73.  As noted above, the EAC did not give the court jurisdiction over dispute resolution under the 
Customs Union and Common Market protocols.  In its 15th ordinary meeting, the EAC Summit decided 
to extend the jurisdiction of the EACJ to include commercial, investment and monetary matters, but 
decided to work with the African Union (rather than the EACJ) on matters relating to human rights and 
crimes against humanity.  See E. AFRICAN CMTY., COMMUNIQUÉ OF THE 15TH ORDINARY SUMMIT OF 
THE EAC HEADS OF STATE ¶ 16 (2013), available at http://www.eac.int/index.php?option=com_ 
content&view=article&id=1437:communique-15th-ordinary-summit-of-the-eac-heads-of-state-&catid= 
146:press-releases&Itemid=194. 
 74.  EALA, Official Report of the Proceedings of the East African Legislative Assembly, 2nd 
Sitting, 1st Assemb., 1st Sess., 2nd Meeting 22 (Jan. 21, 2002) (statement of Rose Waruhiu, Member of 
Parliament for Kenya) (emphasis added), available at http://www.eala.org/key-documents/doc_details/ 
35-21-january-2002.html. 
GATHII MACRO (DO NOT DELETE) 6/30/2014  3:29 PM 
262 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 24:249 
This view of EAC integration is shared by a broad coalition of civil society 
groups that see the EACJ as a pressure point for advancing their goals.75  It 
is therefore not surprising that the court’s human rights jurisprudence has 
won the support of these civil society groups: in particular the East African 
Law Society (EALS) and Kituo Cha Katiba, two leading regional human 
rights groups that have deep roots in East Africa.76  The court’s human 
rights case law has also been widely embraced by a broad range of civil 
society groups beyond those involved in constitutional, pro-democracy, and 
electoral issues, including governmental entities such as national human 
rights institutions in East Africa.77  Although the adoption of human rights 
as national policy has had varying success across East African countries, 
the EAC was reestablished at a time when human rights campaigns had 
gained considerable credibility and experience within civil society groups, 
particularly in Kenya and Uganda.78  The reestablishment provided 
possibilities for civil society groups to engage in human rights work at a 
regional level and without the same scrutiny as at the national level. 
A. The Early Years: Constructing the Role of the EACJ in the EAC 
To understand how the EACJ came to decide its human rights cases, it 
is important to go back to the EACJ’s establishment.  While it was 
inaugurated in 2001, the EACJ did not receive any cases until 2005.  That 
year, a leading human rights scholar and former dean of the University of 
Makerere Law School in Uganda declared the court effectively stillborn, 
not only because it had not yet decided any cases but also because the 
Treaty had given it extremely restrictive jurisdiction by expressly declining 
to allow it to hear human rights cases.79 
 
 75.  On the East Africa Law Society’s strategy of using regional courts to advance human rights 
and other goals, see Public Interest Advocacy, E. AFR. L. SOC’Y, http://www.ealawsociety.org/index. 
php/our-programmes/public-interest-advocacy (last visited Feb. 23, 2014). 
 76.  See About the East Africa Law Society, E. AFR. L. SOC’Y, http://www.ealawsociety.org/index. 
php/about-us/who-we-are (last visited May 16, 2014); History of Kituo Cha Katiba, KITUO CHA 
KATIBA: E. AFR. CENTER FOR CONST. DEV., http://www.kituochakatiba.org/about-us/history-kituo-cha-
katiba (last visited May 16, 2014). 
 77.  See EAC States Urged to Respect Human Rights, GUARDIAN (Dar es Salaam) (Jan. 25, 2012), 
available at http://www.ippmedia.com/frontend/?l=37805 (showing the interest of national human 
rights institutions in joining with civil society groups to promote human rights issues within the EAC). 
 78.  See Hans Peter Schmitz, Transnational Activism and Political Change in Kenya and Uganda, 
in THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE 39, 72 (Thomas 
Risse et al. eds., 1999) (concluding that transnational human rights groups in Uganda and Kenya had, 
by the 1990s, managed to transfer human rights norms to their domestic systems and had empowered 
nongovernmental human rights groups). 
 79.  J. Oloka-Onyango, Who Owns the East African Community? 4 (Human Rights & Peace Ctr., 
Occasional Paper Ser. No. 1), available at http://huripec.mak.ac.ug/pdfs/Occasional_series_1.pdf.  As 
the Registrar of the EACJ has noted, 
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Mwatela v. East African Community80 was the first case to be decided 
by the court.81  It was brought by members of the EALA against the EAC 
to end an ongoing power struggle between the Council and the EALA over 
the EALA’s legislative power.82  Article 49 of the Treaty had established 
the EALA as the legislative organ of the Community,83 but the Council 
promulgated 15 Protocols on a variety of EAC integration issues without 
involving EALA.84  Members of the EALA argued that the Council had 
unilaterally grabbed the EALA’s legislative authority85 by legislating 
 
some important stakeholders still do not sufficiently appreciate the crucial role that has been 
entrusted to the Court by the Treaty.  The Court should not be seen as an opponent to the 
policy makers whenever they are not happy with any of its rulings.  The court interprets and 
applies the Treaty provisions for the achievement of the EAC objectives and not for purposes 
of pleasing any of the interested stakeholders. 
John Eudes Ruhangisa, The Role of the Legal Profession in the Regional Integration Process: A Case of 
East African Community, E. AFR. LAW., Nov. 2011, at 9, 14.  In addition to political leaders, the 
Registrar also discussed the EAC’s “Policy Organs,” which he noted have failed to give the court 
sufficient jurisdiction and in some instances have taken jurisdiction from it.  Id.  This refusal to extend 
the court’s jurisdiction is reflected in the failure to date of the Council to approve the 2005 Draft 
Protocol to Operationalize the Extended Jurisdiction of the East African Court of Justice (the Zero 
Protocol).  See Solomy Balungi Bossa, Towards a Protocol Extending the Jurisdiction of the East 
African Court of Justice, 4 E. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. & DEMOCRACY 31, 34–37 (2006) (describing the draft 
protocol).  The Council has not supported, and in fact has formally opposed, extending the jurisdiction 
of the court to include cases involving human rights and even those under the Customs Union and 
Common Market Protocols.  Interview with Donald Deya, Chief Exec. Officer, Pan African Lawyers 
Union, in Arusha, Tanz. (May 2012).  The decision not to confer jurisdiction over cases under the 
Protocols was deliberate and meant to cause “mischief.”  Id.  One of the court’s strategic objectives is 
“[t]o proactively influence a positive shift in mindset of EAC Policy Organs and other Stakeholders 
concerning the role and place of the Court.”  EACJ STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 6, at 19. 
 80.  Appl. No. 1 of 2005 (Oct. 2006), available at http://eacj.huriweb.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2012/11/EACJ_reference_No1_2005.pdf. 
 81.  Anne Pieter van der Mei, Regional Integration: The Contribution of the Court of Justice of 
the East African Community, 69 ZaöRV 403, 407 (2009) 407 (2009). 
 82.  Mwatela, Appl. No. 1 of 2005, at 1. 
 83.  Under this article, the Assembly 
(a) shall liaise with the National Assemblies of the Partner States on matters relating to the 
Community; 
(b) shall debate and approve the budget of the Community; 
(c) shall consider annual reports on the activities of the Community, annual audit reports of 
the Audit Commission and any other reports referred to it by the Council; 
(d) shall discuss all matters pertaining to the Community and make recommendations to the 
Council as it may deem necessary for the implementation of the Treaty; 
(e) may for purposes of carrying out its functions, establish any committee or committees for 
such purposes as it deems necessary; 
(f) shall recommend to the Council the appointment of the Clerk and other officers of the 
Assembly; and 
(g) shall make its rules of procedure and those of its committees. 
The Assembly may perform any other functions as are conferred upon it by this treaty. 
EAC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 49. 
 84.  Mwatela, Appl. No. 1 of 2005, at 2–3. 
 85.  EALA, supra note 5, at 7 (statement of Jared Kangwana, Member of Parliament for Kenya) 
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through Protocols that required only ratification by member States and not 
the EALA imprimatur.86  EALA members also argued that between 2001 
and 2005, the Council had only introduced two substantive bills before the 
EALA.87  EALA members argued that this was contrary to the Treaty.88  
Furthermore, when members of the EALA introduced private members 
bills for passage, the Sectoral Council on Legal and Judicial Affairs, which 
reports to the Council, withdrew them from the EALA agenda.89  Enraged, 
members of the EALA saw the withdrawal as a continuation of executive 
fiat by the Council.90  Therefore, EALA members unanimously resolved to 
take the Council to the EACJ for a legal determination of the competencies 
of each of the EAC organs under the Treaty.91  They also sought to have the 
court hold that the Council’s withdrawal of the private members bills from 
the EALA agenda had been inconsistent with the Treaty.92 
The court agreed with the EALA and held that the Sectoral Council 
had been constituted inconsistently with the Treaty.93  As a result, it 
invalidated the Council’s decision to withdraw the bills from EALA other 
 
(“[T]here is an attempt to legislate through protocols in this Community and thereby avoid bringing 
Bills into this House, either out of fear or out of a sinister motive to empower the Executive with 
legislative powers!”). 
 86.  Id. at 8.  EALA members, especially those from Kenya, argued that ratification had not been 
properly pursued.  Id.  There were shouts of “dictatorship” and “banana republic,” indicating the sense 
within the EALA that the Council had opted to take the easy political route to undertake integration 
objectives, rather than the legislative process.  Id. 
 87.  Id. at 4 (statement of Med Kaggwa, Chairperson of the Comm. on Legal Affairs, Rules and 
Privileges). 
 88.  Mwatela, Appl. No. 1 of 2005, at 8–9. 
 89.  Id. at 4–5. 
 90.  Id. at 8. 
 91.  EALA, supra note 5, at 14 (statement of Kate Kamba, Member of Parliament for Tanz.) 
(“[W]e should be taken seriously hence the need to have a proper interpretation of our mandate; 
whether we are actually needed in the East African Community as a body or we are just redundant.  It 
should be clear so that we leave a legacy . . . .”); Sukhdev Chhatbar, East Africa: EAC Law Makers Go 
to Court over AG’s “Interference” in Assembly, E. AFR., Dec. 13, 2005, available at http://allafrica. 
com/stories/200512130552.html.  EALA’s concerns about its own redundancy and relevance were 
shared by the court and many lawyers, particularly those in EALS, who had been strategizing about the 
best ways to use the court’s judicial authority.  Interview with Donald Deya, Chief Exec. Officer, Pan 
African Lawyers Union, in Arusha, Tanz. (Oct. 2012); Interview with Donald Deya, Chief Exec. 
Officer, Pan African Lawyers Union, in Arusha, Tanz. (May 2011).  Relevance was a concern at the 
court because no suit had yet been filed with it; the judges were “bored.”  Interview with Donald Deya, 
Chief Exec. Officer, Pan African Lawyers Union, in Arusha, Tanz. (Oct. 2012); Interview with Donald 
Deya, Chief Exec. Officer, Pan African Lawyers Union, in Arusha, Tanz. (May 2011). 
 92.  Mwatela, Appl. No. 1 of 2005, at 6–7. 
 93.  Id. at 8.  The court noted that among the members who sat on the Sectoral Council was the 
Tanzanian Attorney General, yet the Tanzanian Constitution does not identify the Attorney General as a 
Minister.  Id. at 12.  The Treaty requires membership in the Council of Ministers, and therefore the 
Sectoral Council, to be made up of Ministers responsible for EAC cooperation matters.  Id. 
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than through the legislative process.94  Furthermore, the EACJ determined 
that the Council had no powers under the Treaty to withdraw bills 
introduced by private members without observing Assembly bills on the 
withdrawal of such bills.95 
At least two consequences followed from the Mwatela case, which 
gave the EACJ its first opportunity to emerge from invisibility and 
obscurity with headline-grabbing decisions.  First, the court began to define 
itself by decisions that avoid the judicial subservience to political organs 
that has long characterized judicial decision-making in East African 
national judiciaries.  Mwatela represents a successful instance of legislative 
pushback against the EAC executive organs.  The pique between the EALA 
and the EAC political organs, namely the Council, gave the EACJ an 
opening to judicially determine the balance of power among EAC organs.96  
Second, the court indicated its independence from the EAC executive 
organs, which began to attempt to to limit its jurisdiction after the case.  
The outcome of this case reflected the court’s readiness to begin deciding 
cases independently. 
One of the court’s boldest decisions involved a rift in the Kenyan 
Parliament over the election of Kenyan members of the EALA.97  The rift 
was a reflection of deep mistrust between and within political parties.98  
Instead of holding an election for members of the EALA, as required by 
Article 50 of the Treaty,99 the government-controlled House Business 
Committee in the Parliament divided up the EALA seats among the 
Kenyan political parties in proportion to their strength in the Parliament.100  
A dispute arose.  Two of the political parties submitted more than one list 
 
 94.  Id. at 18.  The court further noted that “the Assembly is a representative organ in the 
Community set up to enhance a people centred cooperation” and that “its independence under Article 
16 of the Treaty should be preserved because the Treaty has not endowed the Council with any power 
to interfere in the operation of the Assembly.”  Id. at 20. 
 95.  Id. at 18.  Furthermore, the court noted that Articles 14(3)(c) and 16 of the Treaty “dispel any 
notion that the decisions of the Council albeit on policy issues bind the Assembly in respect of any 
matter within its jurisdiction.”  Id. at 19.  It stated that it had “come to the conclusion that decisions of 
the Council have no place in areas of jurisdiction of the Summit, Court and the Assembly.”  Id. at 21. 
 96.  Don Deya, EACJ Landmark Ruling Will Enhance the Rule of Law in the East African Region, 
LEGALBRIEF AFR., Oct. 10, 2006, available at http://www.legalbrief.co.za/article.php?story= 
20061010102755202. 
 97.  Nyong’o v. Attorney Gen. of Kenya (Nyong’o III), Ref. No. 1 of 2006, at 2–5 (Mar. 30, 
2007), available at http://eacj.huriweb.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/EACJ_Reference_No_1_2006. 
pdf. 
 98.  Interview with an attorney involved in the Nyong’o case, in Nairobi, Kenya (Aug. 2, 2013). 
 99.  EAC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 50. 
 100.  Nyong’o III, Ref. No. 1 of 2006, at 2–5. 
GATHII MACRO (DO NOT DELETE) 6/30/2014  3:29 PM 
266 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 24:249 
of nominees for the EALA seats.101  Another of the parties submitted its list 
to a Parliamentary official.102  The claimants filed suit in the EACJ, 
alleging a violation of Article 50 of the Treaty.103  The issue before the 
court was therefore whether the election of Kenya’s members to the EALA 
had been conducted democratically and consistently with the Treaty.104 
In Nyong’o, the EACJ granted interim orders restraining the Clerk of 
the EALA and the Secretary-General of the EAC from recognizing the 
election of the nine Kenyan nominees until the court could decide the case 
on the merits.105  The Kenyan government argued that only the High Court 
of Kenya had jurisdiction to decide the legality of the election of Kenyan 
legislators to the EALA.106  It urged that an EACJ decision would, in effect, 
usurp the authority of the High Court.107  The Kenyan government further 
argued that the applicants had no locus standi to bring the case since in 
Kenya, only the Attorney General could bring a suit to enforce the public 
interest.108 
By contrast, the applicants argued that the legality of the election rules 
and the process of nomination and approval of the EALA nominees could 
be challenged before the EACJ under Article 30 of the Treaty,109 which 
gives any person who is resident in any of the EAC member states the 
ability to bring a case to the court.110  The applicants also contended that 
Kenya had violated Article 50 of the Treaty when selecting its nine 
members and that the elections were therefore void.111  Article 50 
 
 101.  Id. at 3. 
 102.  Id. at 4 (noting that one list “was submitted by the party leader through the Clerk to the 
National Assembly as provided by the election rules. The other was presented to the Committee, in its 
afternoon session on 25th October, by the Government Chief Whip”). 
 103.  Id. at 2. 
 104.  Id. at 7–8. 
 105.  Nyong’o v. Attorney Gen. of Kenya (Nyong’o I), Ref. No. 1 of 2006, at 10 (Nov. 27, 2006), 
available at http://eacj.huriweb.org/wp-content/uploads/2006/11/EACJ_rulling_on_injunction_ref_ 
No1_2006.pdf. 
 106.  Id. at 4 (“[J]urisdiction over the interpretation and application of the Treaty does not extend to 
determining questions arising from elections of members of the EALA.”).  The Attorney General 
pointed out that Article 52(1) of the Treaty expressly reserves the jurisdiction to determine such 
questions to the appropriate institutions of the Partner States.  Id.; see also EAC Treaty, supra note 8, 
art. 52(1) (“Any question that may arise whether any person is an elected member of the Assembly . . . 
shall be determined by the institution of the Partner State that determines questions of the election of 
members of the National Assembly . . . .”). 
 107.  Nyong’o III, Ref. No. 1 of 2006, at 13. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  EAC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 30 (allowing “Legal and Natural Persons” to file references to 
the EACJ for infringements of the Treaty). 
 111.  Nyong’o III, Ref. No. 1 of 2006, at 7. 
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“stipulates that the elected members shall, as much as feasible, be 
representative of specified groups, and sets out the qualifications for 
election.”112  The court agreed with the applicants.  It held that Article 50 
must be read to require a process by which members of each partner state’s 
parliament vote for, rather than appoint, the State’s members to the 
EALA.113  Since the Parliament had not voted for its EALA members, the 
court found that an election as required by Article 50 of the Treaty had not 
taken place.114  This in turn precluded application of Article 52(1), which 
would have given Kenya exclusive jurisdiction if an election had taken 
place.115  The court held that Kenya had violated the provisions of Article 
50 of the Treaty by holding a “fictitious election in lieu of a real 
election.”116  The court noted that the Parliament had not made its rules on 
electing EALA members “in exercise of sovereignty inherent in a state, but 
in exercise of a discretionary power conferred on it by the Treaty.”117 
The court also declared its supremacy over national courts in the 
interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty.118  Furthermore, the court 
concluded that there was neither a requirement of exhaustion of local 
remedies prior to invoking its jurisdiction119 nor a locus standi bar that 
prevented East African residents from enjoying the cause of action 
expressly provided by Article 30 of the Treaty.120 
The public visibility of Mwatela was low compared to that of 
Nyong’o.  As the next section demonstrates, the Nyong’o case so provoked 
East African presidents that the court witnessed the first reduction of its 
authority. 
 
 112.  Id. at 3 (emphasis added). 
 113.  Nyong’o III, Ref. No. 1 of 2006, at 34. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. at 14–22. 
 116.  Id. at 43. 
 117.  Id. at 42.  The court affirmed this conclusion in a similar 2011 challenge from Uganda.  See 
Democratic Party v. Sec’y Gen. of the E. African Cmty., App. No. 6 of 2011 (First Instance Div. Nov. 
30, 2011), available at http://eacj.huriweb.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Democratic-Party-Vs-
Secretary-General.pdf (restraining the Attorney General and Parliament of Uganda from proceeding 
with the election of EALA members from Uganda until the court could determine whether the rules of 
election to the EALA set by the Ugandan Parliament were consistent with Article 50 of the Treaty, 
particularly because they did not allow members of opposition parties to compete in those elections). 
 118.  Nyong’o III, Ref. No. 1 of 2006, at 20. 
 119.  Id. at 21. 
 120.  Id. at 16–17 (concluding that no provision of the Treaty “requires directly or by implication 
the claimant to show a right or an interest that was infringed and/or damage that was suffered as a 
consequence of the matter complained of in the reference”). 
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B. Backlash Following Nyong’o 
When Nyong’o was handed down, outrage from Kenya and the 
Council quickly followed.121  The EACJ was criticized for overstepping its 
jurisdiction.122  Treaty amendments to reduce the court’s authority were 
quickly proposed.123  Without broad consultation, the Summit quickly 
approved the amendments on December 14, 2006.124  These amendments 
included restructuring the court into two divisions, a First Instance Division 
and an Appellate Division; providing grounds for appeal to the Appellate 
Division; adding additional grounds for removing a judge from office; 
limiting the court’s jurisdiction “so as not to apply to ‘jurisdiction 
conferred by the Treaty on organs of Partner States’”; and adding a two-
month time limit for cases brought by legal and natural persons.125  
Additionally, the amendments allowed an EACJ judge to be removed from 
office after being removed from office in a partner state for misconduct.126 
EALS swiftly came to the court’s defense via terse editorials in the 
press and letters to the three East African presidents.127  Invoking Article 30 
 
 121.  E. African Law Soc’y v. Attorney Gen. of Kenya, Ref. No. 3 of 2007, at 1–5 (2008), 
available at http://eacj.huriweb.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Ref-3-of-2007.pdf; Kibaki Rails at 
EAC Court as Rwanda, Burundi Join Up, E. AFR. (Dec. 4, 2006, 00:00), http://www.theeastafrican.co. 
ke/news/-/2558/252342/-/t6awg5z/-/index.html. 
 122.  See Attorney Gen. of Kenya v. Nyong’o (Nyong’o II), Appl. No. 5 of 2007, at 22 (Feb. 6, 
2007), arising from Ref. No. 1 of 2006, available at http://eacj.huriweb.org/wp-content/uploads/2007/ 
02/EACJ_application_No5_2007.pdf (“We note that clearly the amendment is a direct reaction to the 
impugned ruling of the Court.  In his response to the reference filed on 30th December 2006, the 
applicant continues to protest the Court’s jurisdiction, an issue that was already decided . . . .”). 
 123.  E. African Law Soc’y, Ref. No. 3 of 2007, at 1–5. 
 124.  Id. at 4.  While the final decision in Nyong’o was not released until four months after the 
amendments, the court had announced that it was granting the claimants jurisdiction in November 2006.  
Id. at 3. 
 125.  Id. at 4–5.  Several EAC member states have invoked the two-month time limit to challenge 
the admissibility of human rights cases coming before the court.  See supra note 43 and accompanying 
text (discussing the Rugumba case’s rejection of such an argument). 
 126.  E. African Law Soc’y, Ref. No. 3 of 2007, at 4–5.  When this amendment was passed, the two 
Kenyan judges sitting on the court had been subject to just such a removal, stemming from allegations 
of corruption made in 2003.  Kibaki Rails at EAC Court as Rwanda, Burundi Join Up, supra note 121.  
The Kenyan government attempted to have these two judges removed from the EACJ bench pursuant to 
the amendments, but their efforts were successfully stopped.  Mwalimu Mati, Kenya is Guilty of 
Judicial Interference, E. AFR. (Feb. 26, 2007, 00:00), http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/opOrEd/-/ 
434748/253402/-/rbk891z/-/index.html. 
 127.  See, e.g., East Africa: Why Undermining EA Court is Sheer Folly, Op-Ed., E. AFR. (Dec. 12, 
2006), available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200612120533.html (“The Court is under a solemn 
Treaty obligation to independently interpret, apply and ensure compliance with the Treaty, without fear, 
favour or prejudice, and without intimidation or ridicule from any person or institution.  Ridiculing any 
one organ of the EAC has the further effect of ridiculing the entire edifice of the EAC, and the people of 
East Africa who these organs were set up to serve.  Proposing amendments that may weaken the EACJ 
has the added effect of scaring local, regional and international investment.”). 
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of the Treaty, which allows anyone in the EAC to file suit in the EACJ, 
EALS filed suit against the EAC members, challenging the legality of the 
amendments under Article 150 of the Treaty on the grounds that the EAC 
members had not followed the correct procedures for amending the 
Treaty.128  The Attorney General of Tanzania and the Secretary General of 
the EAC argued “that under international law, the applicants were not 
competent to challenge the sovereign right of the Partner States to amend 
the Treaty to which they were parties.”129  The Attorney General of Uganda 
argued that the claim was “incompetent and misconceived because there 
was no dispute among the parties to the Treaty.”130  The Attorney General 
of Kenya argued that the amendments were actually decisions of the 
Summit and thus not reviewable under Article 30.131 
The court rejected these objections, reasoning that the claimants were 
not challenging the partner states’ sovereign right to amend the Treaty but 
rather the failure to abide by the amendment procedures therein.132  The 
court also held that Article 30 gives legal persons the right to petition the 
court when there is an infringement of the Treaty.133  The court decided 
that, although Article 30 makes no mention of this right with respect to 
Treaty violations by an organ of the Community, restricting the article so 
that it could not be used in those situations would defeat its purpose.134  
Furthermore, the court held that 
 
[t]he alleged infringement is the totality of the process of the Treaty 
amendment, which amendment was, and can only be made by the parties 
to the Treaty, namely the Partner States, acting together through the 
organs of the Community.  It follows that if in the amendment process 
the Treaty was infringed, it was infringed by the Partner States.  The 
reference therefore cannot be barred on the ground that its subject matter 
are decisions and actions of organs of the Community.135 
 
Therefore, the court determined that it had jurisdiction.  It concluded that 
 
 128.  E. African Law Soc’y, Ref. No 3 of 2007, at 5–6. 
 129.  Id. at 9. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Id. at 13. 
 133.  Id. at 13–14.  In Nyongo, the EACJ had held that “once a question of infringement of the 
Treaty is properly referred to this Court under Article 30, the question ceases to be of purely personal 
interest.”  Nyong’o v. Attorney Gen. of Kenya (Nyong’o III), Ref. No. 1 of 2006, at 36 (Mar. 30, 2007), 
available at http://eacj.huriweb.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/EACJ_Reference_No_1_2006.pdf. 
 134.  E. African Law Soc’y, Ref. No 3 of 2007, at 15. 
 135.  Id. at 16. 
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the ratification process for the amendments constituted an infringement of 
Articles 5(3)(g), 7(1)(a), and 150 of the Treaty because the partner states 
had not allowed the private sector and civil society to participate in the 
drafting of the amendments.136  The court decided, however, not to 
invalidate the amendments because “the infringement was not a conscious 
one,” it was “not likely to recur” after the court’s ruling, and “not all the 
resultant amendments are incompatible with Treaty objectives.”137 
The significance that Kenya attached to this case is demonstrated by 
the fact that the Kenyan Attorney General, Amos Wako, traveled to the seat 
of the EACJ in Arusha, Tanzania, to argue the case, accompanied by 
leading attorneys from Kenya, including Gibson Kamau Kuria, Kenyan 
Solicitor General Wanjuki Muchemi, and Senior Deputy Solicitor General 
Muthoni Kimani,138 who had represented several Kenyan governmental 
officials and the Kenyan government in Nyong’o.139  This appearance was 
highly unusual, as each EAC member state has designated lawyers who 
appear on their behalf.140  Kuria had reached the rank of Senior Counsel 
and is one of the best-known human rights lawyers in Africa.141  Kimani is 
a long-serving and respected Deputy Solicitor General for the Government 
of Kenya.142  While in Arusha, Wanjuki and Kimani visited the offices of 
the two Kenyan judges, one of whom was the president of the court, and 
asked them to recuse themselves from hearing the case, threatening to file a 
recusal motion if the judges refused.143  The judges informed their 
colleagues of the request and received unanimous support.144  The Kenyan 
team then sought unsuccessfully to have the judges recuse themselves from 
the case in light of the allegations of corruption pending against them.145 
This incident dramatically represents one of the most courageous acts 
of judicial officers in East Africa.  The judges refused to bow to threats of 
 
 136.  Id. at 30–31. 
 137.  Id. at 43–44. 
 138.  Interview with Judge, First Instance Div., E. African Court of Justice, in Nairobi, Kenya 
(Aug. 2, 2013). 
 139.  Interview with Attorney Involved in the Nyong’o case in Nairobi, Kenya (Aug. 2, 2013). 
 140.  See, e.g., E. African Law Soc’y, Ref. No 3 of 2007, at 8 (listing counsel that appeared in the 
case). 
 141.  Marvine Howe, Kenya Human-Rights Lawyer Urges Economic Sanctions by U.S., N.Y. 
TIMES, July 29, 1990, at 16 (noting that Kamau Kuria is a prominent human rights lawyer and was the 
1988 recipient of the Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights Award). 
 142.  BIOGRAPHY OF THOSE AWARDED, available at http://www.kra.go.ke/pdf/news/BIOGRAPHY 
%20OF%20THOSE%20AWARDED.pdf. 
 143.  Attorney Gen. of Kenya v. Nyong’o (Nyong’o II), Appl. No. 5 of 2007, at 8 (Feb. 6, 2007), 
available at http://eacj.huriweb.org/wp-content/uploads/2007/02/EACJ_application_No5_2007.pdf. 
 144.  Interview with EACJ Appellate Judge and President in Arusha, Tanz. (July 30, 2013). 
 145.  Nyong’o II, Appl. No. 5 of 2007, at 8 (dismissing the application for recusal). 
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public exposure of allegations of corruption leveled against them.  The 
court asserted its jurisdictional power even though it exercised caution in 
deciding not to strike down the amendments.  The case can thus be viewed 
as a procedural pushback but a substantive acquiescence to the EAC 
political organs.146  This caution is understandable given the amendments 
following the Nyong’o decision and the absence of a tradition in East 
Africa of courts holding political actors accountable through judicial 
review.  The court’s caution in its early years is comparable to that of the 
European Court of Justice during its early years, when it also often 
enunciated bold principles that it would apply irresolutely.147  These 
principles, such as the supremacy of European Community law, would later 
become widely accepted, however.148 
By holding that locus standi and exhaustion of domestic remedies are 
not preconditions to filing cases and by establishing that individuals can 
file cases to establish whether one of the partner states in the EAC had 
acted consistently with the Treaty, the EACJ’s prior decisions opened the 
door for it to decide its first explicit human rights case in November 2007.  
The many relationships and networks that the court had built since its 
establishment also led to the filing of cases that raised even more difficult 
questions surrounding the sovereignty of EAC member states than were 
presented in Nyong’o. 
C. The Role of the Judges and the Registrar in Promoting the EACJ 
As noted above, the EACJ’s first decision, Mwatela, sought to resolve 
the battle for supremacy between the executive and legislative organs of the 
EAC, and in the process, the court declared its own supremacy in the 
judicial resolution of disputes arising between EAC organs.  In so doing, 
the court began cultivating a reputation as an independent and authoritative 
interpreter of the respective roles of the political bodies of the EAC.  The 
court’s judges and registrar understood that their reputation and authority 
lay not only within the political branches of the EAC, which excluded the 
court from meetings of its most senior officials,149 but also outside the 
 
 146.  I thank Karen Alter for this insight. 
 147.  Karen Alter, Who Are the “Masters of the Treaty”?: European Governments and the 
European Court of Justice, 52 INT’L ORG. 121, 131 (1998) (discussing the European Court of Justice’s 
enunciation of bold principles in its early years in ways that did not threaten backlash from European 
Community members). 
 148.  See id. at 122 (noting that in its early years, the European Court of Justice “developed legal 
doctrine and thus constructed the institutional building blocks of its own power and authority without 
provoking a political response”). 
 149.  Interview with Donald Deya, Chief Exec. Officer, Pan African Lawyers Union, in Arusha, 
Tanz. (May 2012). 
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EAC.  Thus, between 2001 and 2005, they cultivated an extensive network 
of users and supporters, including members of the East Africa Law Society, 
human rights nongovernmental organizations, the media, professional 
organizations, and the private sector.  These relationships provided a 
crucial insurance mechanism as the court began to exercise its jurisdiction 
over human rights cases with very few resources and against the wishes of 
EAC member states.  The judges have capitalized on opportunities to 
decide controversial cases, which have legitimized them as independent 
actors not subject to the political control of the EAC’s executive organs nor 
beholden to the conservative and positivist judicial tendencies that 
characterize national judiciaries.  Furthermore, each subsequent set of 
judges has demonstrated forcefulness in some decisions balanced with 
restraint in others.150 
The EACJ was established at a moment when a new ideational context 
involving respect for human rights and constitutional governance was 
taking shape.151  This new context arose in part as a result of dramatic 
social and political changes in East Africa during which one-party states 
gave way to varying degrees of multi-party democracy and competitive 
politics.152  For the first time since independence from colonial rule, civil 
society groups, especially in the human rights, democracy, and rule of law 
arenas, emerged and became established players in initiatives to hold their 
governments accountable for excesses that had often gone unchallenged 
under authoritarian rule.153  The judges of the court worked closely with 
 
 150.  See, e.g., Nyambura v. Attorney Gen. of Uganda, Ref. No. 11 of 2011 (First Instance Div. 
Feb. 24, 2014), available at http://eacj.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/REFERENCE-NO.-11-OF-
2011-Final.pdf (noting that the court has jurisdiction under the Treaty to decide cases involving 
allegations of violations of human rights but dismissing the case for having been untimely filed); 
Attorney Gen. of Uganda v. Awadh, App. No. 2 of 2012 (App. Div. Apr. 15, 2013), arising out of Appl. 
No. 4 of 2011 in Ref. No. 4 of 2011, available at http://eacj.huriweb.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/ 
AG_Uganda_v_Omar_Awadh_and_6_Others.pdf (narrowly construing the two-month limitation period 
for filing a suit in the court). 
 151.  EACJ STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 6, at 10 (noting that the court operates in a context in 
which there “has been an upsurge in advocacy for good governance, human rights and democracy” and 
in which East African citizens “are more enlightened and more knowledgeable about their rights” and 
“more assertive and demanding”); see also FRANS VILJOEN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN 
AFRICA 482 (2d ed. 2012) (noting the rise of pro-democracy movements and human rights advocacy 
after the cold war in Africa). 
 152.  Chris Maina Peter, Conclusion: Coming of Age: NGOs and State Accountability in East 
Africa, in HUMAN RIGHTS NGOS IN EAST AFRICA: POLITICAL AND NORMATIVE TENSIONS, supra note 
12, at 305, 308 (noting that NGOs in East Africa have been active in seeking political accountability); 
see also Manuel Manrique, Supporting Africa’s New Civil Society: The Case for Kenya, POL’Y BRIEF 
(FRIDE, Madrid, Spain), June 2011, at 1, available at http://www.fride.org/descarga/PB_83_Kenya.pdf 
(“Across Africa the post-Cold War period was one of apparent political liberalisation – four competitive 
multiparty systems existed in 1990; not a formal single party state remained five years later.”). 
 153.  Interview with Donald Deya, Chief Exec. Officer, Pan African Lawyers Union, in Arusha, 
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these civil society groups, in particular the East Africa Law Society, in 
defining the court’s place among the EAC organs.154  In 2003, the Raoul 
Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law provided 
training on human rights, regional systems, and the role of the judiciary to 
the judges, with support from the Swedish Agency for International 
Development.155  This training included tours to international courts, such 
as the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of 
Justice.156  These opportunities persuaded the judges to refrain from 
adopting the conservative judicial ideology that was prevalent in the 
national courts of the member states during authoritarian rule.157  Instead, 
the judges decided to build an independent and credible court based on 
these new values. 
While the court itself has embraced human rights as a means of 
holding governments accountable, however, there is variation in the 
willingness of individual judges to do so.  Many of the judges sit on their 
national courts as well, although this is not one of the qualifications for 
membership on the court.158  Some of the judges continue to exhibit a 
commitment to a more textualist approach,159 much as their national courts 
are often skeptical of their responsibility to protect human rights and to 
hold authoritarian governments accountable for their human rights 
violations.160 
Without strong national human rights courts, parties have been forced 
 
Tanz. (Oct. 2012).  The spread and effectiveness of the civil society movement in the five East African 
countries is very uneven.  Kenya certainly has the best organized civil society movement, particularly in 
the rule of law, democracy, and human rights sectors, followed by Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, and 
Rwanda.  Id. 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  Id.  The cooperation between the court and the Institute started in 2003, was funded by the 
Swedish government, and was initiated by the Swedish Embassy in Nairobi.  E-mail from Johannes 
Eile, Head of the Dep’t for Int’l Programmes, Raoul Wallenberg Inst. of Human Rights & Humanitarian 
Law (Nov.–Dec. 2012) (on file with author).  That cooperation continues to date.  See Training for the 
East African Court of Justice, RAOUL WALLENBERG INST. OF HUM. RTS. AND HUMANITARIAN L., 
http://rwi.lu.se/training-east-african-court-justice/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2014) (“The Institute is currently 
conducting a two-week training in Nairobi for the judges of the East African Court of Justice, as part of 
its cooperation programme with the Court under the Regional Africa Programme.”). 
 156.  Interview with Donald Deya, Chief Exec. Officer, Pan African Lawyers Union, in Arusha, 
Tanz. (Oct. 2012). 
 157.  See Oloka-Onyango, supra note 79, at 5 (concluding that the Treaty provisions on the 
appointment of judges and on the court’s jurisdiction add to the “traditional distance” that courts in the 
region have through their inability to affect the lives of ordinary people). 
 158.  See Interview with EACJ Appellate Judge and President in Arusha, Tanz. (July 30, 2013) (“It 
is not quite correct to say that all EACJ judges work as judges in their national jurisdiction.”); Interview 
with EACJ Principal Judge of the First Instance Division in Arusha, Tanz. (July 30, 2013). 
 159.  See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
 160.  Interview with EACJ Judge in Nairobi, Kenya (June 2012). 
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to turn to regional courts such as the EACJ and ECCJ161 as alternative 
venues.162  For instance, Nyong’o was brought at a time when the Kenyan 
judiciary was viewed with much distrust and disdain.163  The litigants 
turned to the EACJ since at the time Kenyan courts were not regarded as 
being a reliable option to enforce the Bill of Rights.164  In addition, EAC 
national courts are swamped with a backlog of cases.165  Moreover, the 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights has only recently begun its 
work after many years of stalemate.166  Its access rules for private parties to 
file suit are very narrow.167  Additionally, the EACJ allows the filing of 
briefs in forma pauperis: indigent persons filing meritorious cases can be 
exempted from paying the fees associated with bringing a case.168  These 
low financial costs (relative to the costs associated with filing cases in 
national courts) combined with the court’s low procedural barriers to 
litigation169 make the EACJ very accessible.170 
 
 161.  See Alter, Helfer & McAllister, supra note 71, at 755–56 (arguing that the explicit conferral 
on the ECCJ of jurisdiction over human rights was the direct result of concerted lobbying by judges of 
the court and officials of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)); see also 
Karen J. Alter, The Global Spread of European Style International Courts, 35 W. EUR. POL. 135, 150 
(2012) (“[H]uman rights activists have decisively shaped how the ECCJ has evolved.”). 
 162.  See Solomon Tamarabrakemi Ebobrah, Legitimacy and Feasibility of Human Rights 
Realisation Through Regional Economic Communities in Africa: The Case of the Economic 
Community of West African States (Sept. 30, 2009) (unpublished LL.D. dissertation, University of 
Pretoria), available at http://upetd.up.ac.za/thesis/available/etd-02102010-085034/ (arguing that sub-
regional courts such as the ECCJ and the EACJ have become more important venues for the promotion 
of human rights because of the limited jurisdictional provisions of the African Court of Human and 
Peoples’ Rights). 
 163.  Interview with EACJ Judge in Nairobi, Kenya (June 2012). 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  Jacob Ngetich, Justice on Trial as Case Backlog Returns to Haunt the Judiciary, STANDARD 
DIGITAL (Jan. 19, 2014, 00:00), http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=2000102645. 
 166.  See African Court in Brief, AFR. CT. ON HUM. & PEOPLES’ RTS., http://www.african-court. 
org/en/index.php/about-the-court/brief-history (last visited May 17, 2014) (noting that the Court was 
established by a Protocol that was adopted in 1999 but that it only issued its first decision in 2009). 
 167.  Suits are only permissible when a State that has ratified the court’s protocol agrees to permit 
an individual or NGO access to the court in cases involving that person or NGO.  Dan Juma, Access to 
the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Case of the Poacher Turned Gamekeeper, ESSEX 
HUM. RTS. REV., Sept. 2007, at 2–3.  Of the East African States that have ratified the African Court of 
Human and Peoples’ Rights Protocol, only Tanzania and Rwanda have agreed to individual access.  
Press Release, E. African Court of Justice, SG, Four Partner States Taken to Court for Delay to Deposit 
the African Charter of Human and People’s Rights Declarations (Aug. 22, 2013), available at 
http://eacj.org/?p=1344; The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, AFR. UNION, 
http://www.au.int/en/organs/cj (last visited June 21, 2014). 
 168.  Ruhangisa, supra note 79, at 7–8. 
 169.  See supra notes 119–20 and accompanying text. 
 170.  The EACJ rules of procedure were written with a view to removing many of the procedural 
technicalities that make litigation in East African judiciaries complicated, lengthy, and expensive.  
Ruhangisa, supra note 79, at 7–8. 
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The judges and the Registrar have ardently sought to convince other 
organs of the EAC and the public that the viability of the court is crucial.171  
The court has opened sub-registries in two of the five EAC member 
countries to make filing cases easy for East African citizens,172 has openly 
strategized and campaigned for more usage of the court in the region, and 
has participated in sensitization workshops throughout the region informing 
East Africans about its work.173 
The EACJ has not waited for the other organs of the EAC to 
acknowledge its presence, however.  Despite the court’s institutional 
weaknesses,174 its rulings have attracted significant attention from the law 
societies and civil society groups in the region and from scholars.175  The 
judges and registrar have written up a strategic plan for dealing with the 
court’s challenges.176  According to this plan, the mission of the court is to 
“contribute to the enjoyment of the benefits of Regional Integration by 
ensuring adherence to justice, rule of law and fundamental rights and 
freedoms through the interpretation and application of and compliance with 
the East African Law.”177  The court’s strategic plan includes enhancing the 
court’s capacity, proactively influencing other EAC organs on the issue of 
 
 171.  See EACJ STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 6, at vii (identifying the court’s overall strategy as 
“raising visibility . . . seeking extended jurisdiction . . . [and] enhancing the [court’s] human and 
material capacity”); Interview with EACJ Appellate Judge and President in Arusha, Tanz. (July 30, 
2013); Interview with EACJ Principal Judge of the First Instance Division in Arusha, Tanz. (July 30, 
2013). 
 172.  Press Release, E. African Court of Justice, EACJ Opens Sub-registry in Dar-es-Salaam (Sept. 
7, 2012), available at http://www.eac.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1097:eacj-
opens-sub-registry-in-dar-es-salaam&catid=146:press-releases&Itemid=194; Press Release, E. African 
Court of Justice, Chief Justice of Rwanda Officially Opens EACJ Kigali Sub-registry (Aug. 10, 2012), 
available at http://www.eac.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1072:chief-justice-
of-rwanda-officially-opens-eacj-kigali-sub-registry&catid=146:press-releases&Itemid=194. 
 173.  See, e.g., Press Release, African Press Org., EACJ to Hold Sensitization Workshop on Its 
Role in the EAC Integration (Oct. 27, 2011), available at http://appablog.wordpress.com/2011/10/27/ 
eacj-to-hold-sensitization-workshop-on-its-role-in-the-eac-integration/; East African Court of Justice 
Sensitization Workshop Opens in Kampala, Ministry of E. Afr. Cmty. Aff. (Nov. 1, 2011), 
http://www.meaca.go.ug/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=70:east-african-court-of-
justice-sensitization-workshop-opens-in-kampala-&catid=42:press&Itemid=18.  The Court’s strategic 
plan identifies sensitization as a priority.  See EACJ STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 70, at 24. 
 174.  See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text.  The court’s strategic plan identifies several 
“Critical issues . . .: i. The Court not being able to optimally discharge its mandate in the integration 
process[;] ii. Risk of marginalizing the status of the Court[;] iii. Risk of denying the East African 
citizens the right to access the services of an effective regional court[;] iv. Risk of fragmenting 
Community jurisprudence.”  EACJ STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 6, at vii–viii. 
 175.  See, e.g., van der Mei, supra note 81, at 405–06 (noting that the court’s case law indicates its 
“willingness . . . to firmly protect the rule of law, to guarantee individual access to justice and to review 
both acts of the EAC and its Partner States”). 
 176.  See EACJ STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 6. 
 177.  Id. at vii. 
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the court’s role and place, and making the court “visible and indispensable 
in matters related to the discharge of its mandate.”178 
One of the court’s opportunities to advance this plan came in the 
Serengeti case.  In that case, an environmental group filed a suit against the 
government of Tanzania, objecting to the building of a commercial 
highway across the Serengeti National Park.179  The Appellate Division 
ruled against the government of Tanzania, which had argued that the court 
did not have jurisdiction over the case.180  The Registrar welcomed 
conservation and environmental groups and individuals to bring similar 
suits to the EACJ.181  The Serengeti case has raised the profile of the court, 
especially among environmental justice groups outside of East Africa.  A 
large transnational network, similar to that involved in the court’s human 
rights case law, has mobilized.182  These groups have continued to be 
interested in this case and have established a litigation fund for it,183 given 
that the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) has long recognized the Serengeti as a world heritage site.184 
This makes the EACJ very visible in the environmental justice movement, 
which is an additional constituency in its efforts to build up its profile. 
The court’s Registrar, judges, and president have invested a significant 
amount of time and energy advocating for an expanded role for the 
Court.185  Their efforts, under difficult resource constraints and without 
much support from other EAC organs, have undoubtedly ensured that the 
court has not remained moribund or irrelevant; instead, it has carved out a 
place for itself and its fledgling jurisprudence.  The Registrar has also 
publicly and quite vigorously argued in favor of using the EACJ’s 
jurisdiction in investor arbitration cases.186  Harold Nsekela, the court’s 
 
 178.  Id. at viii. 
 179.  Attorney Gen. of Tanz. v. African Network for Animal Welfare, App. No. 3 of 2011, at 2 
(App. Div. Mar. 15, 2012), available at http://eacj.huriweb.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/African-
Network-for-Animal-Welfare-2011-3-appeal-2012.pdf. 
 180.  Id. at 2, 14. 
 181.  Wolfgang H. Thome, Seek Justice at the East African Court, Registrar Tells 
Environmentalists and Conservationists, WOLFGANG H. THOME’S BLOG (Mar. 24, 2012), 
http://wolfganghthome.wordpress.com/2012/03/24/seek-justice-at-the-east-african-court-registrar-tells-
environmentalists-and-conservationists/. 
 182.  See, e.g., About Serengeti Watch, SERENGETI WATCH, http://www.savetheserengeti.org/ 
about-us/ (last visited May 18, 2014). 
 183.  See Serengeti Legal Defense Fund, SERENGETI WATCH, http://www.savetheserengeti.org/ 
serengeti-legal-defense-fund/ (last updated Aug. 2013). 
 184.  See Serengeti National Park, UNITED NATIONS EDUC., SCI. & CULTURAL ORG. WORLD 
HERITAGE CONVENTION, http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/156 (last visited Jan. 27, 2014). 
 185.  Interview with EACJ Appellate Judge and President in Arusha, Tanz. (July 30, 2012). 
 186.  Anne Mugisa, East African Court of Justice Underutilised, NEW VISION (Mar. 28, 2012), 
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president, has urged EAC member states to take advantage of the court’s 
jurisdiction over arbitral matters under the Treaty because its judges are 
certified arbitrators who understand the “peculiar” circumstances of EAC 
States, as opposed to arbitrators from outside of Africa, to whom these 
States often resort.187  More recently, the Registrar has argued in favor of 
extending international criminal jurisdiction to the EACJ.188  As with 
arbitration, he has argued that the judges are specialists in international 
criminal law.189  In his view, such jurisdiction is also warranted because it 
would reduce the embarrassment of having the International Criminal 
Court decide cases against East African citizens in The Hague.190 
D. The Role of Interest Groups in Mobilizing the EACJ 
The creation of the EAC in 1999 opened up a new frontier for various 
civil society groups, a broad coalition of professional organizations, and 
members of the private sector to lobby in favor of human rights.  For these 
groups, East African integration was not simply about free trade 
liberalization or integration into a customs union and a common market.  
Rather, issues of political governance, such as human rights, the rule of 
law, and democracy, were at least as crucial.191  This broad coalition drew 
its inspiration from domestic struggles for human rights. 
Although EAC governments have demonstrated hostility toward 
human rights jurisprudence, they have built up human rights expertise so 
that advocacy for human rights is not regarded with the skepticism of 
earlier periods.  Each of them has established a national human rights 
 
available at http://www.kigalikonnect.com/article/east-african-court-of-justice-underutilised.html. 
 187.  Id.; see also Polycarp Machira, Tanzania: Registrar—States Avoid East African Court of 
Justice, CITIZEN (Dar es Salaam) (Apr. 26, 2011), available at http://allafrica.com/stories/ 
201104270129.html.  This preference for non-African arbitrators is perhaps indicative of a common 
“race to the top” practice, in which poor countries, seeking to defend themselves against investors, hire 
top-notch law firms or world-renowned arbitrators to match the caliber of the investors’ legal team.  
Eric Gottwald, Leveling the Playing Field: Is It Time for a Legal Assistance Center for Developing 
Nations in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 22 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 237, 239–40 (2007) (“[M]ost 
developing countries are forced to hire one of a handful of international law firms who charge the same 
premium market rates that wealthy individual investors and corporations pay for their services.”). 
 188.  Eric Kabeera, EAC “Competent to Handle International Criminal Cases,” NEW TIMES 
(Kigali), Aug. 19, 2012, available at http://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/index.php?i=15089&a=12611. 
 189.  Mugisa, supra note 186. 
 190.  Kabeera, supra note 188. 
 191.  Deya, supra note 96; Interview with Donald Deya, Chief Exec. Officer, Pan African Lawyers 
Union, in Arusha, Tanz. (May 2011) (“East African citizens can engage the EAC . . . from a purely 
trade/economic perspective or from a more holistic or ‘altruistic’ perspective.  The . . . private sector 
and civil society associational activity [can be] catalytic of a more people-centered and people-driven 
EAC.”). 
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commission.192  Many EAC government officials also have dual roles in 
sub-regional and regional courts and national institutions with mandates 
over human rights issues.193  Donor funding to support human rights work 
within national governments and regional economic communities has 
popularized and legitimized human rights within governments.194  The 
groups supported with this money, such as EALS, have in turn supported 
litigation before the EACJ. 
One of the key actors in this movement was Donald Deya, who, in the 
mid-2000s, was the CEO of the fledgling EALS, now the largest 
professional membership organization in East Africa.195  He was the 
Deputy CEO and Deputy Secretary of the Law Society of Kenya (LSK) 
during the peak of its multi-pronged pro-democracy struggle against a one-
party dictatorship in the 1990s.196  During Deya’s tenure at LSK, the 
 
 192.  See Burundi Inaugurates Independent National Human Rights Commissioners, UNITED 
NATIONS OFF. IN BURUNDI, http://bnub.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?ctl=Details&tabid=2961&mid= 
5312&ItemID=3130 (last visited Jan. 10, 2014); COMMISSION FOR HUM. RTS. & GOOD GOVERNANCE, 
http://www.chragg.go.tz/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2014); LA COMMISSION NATIONALE DES DROITS DE LA 
PERSONNE, http://www.cndp.org.rw/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2014); KENYA NAT’L COMMISSION ON HUM. 
RTS., http://www.knchr.org/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2014); UGANDA HUM. RTS. COMMISSION, 
http://www.uhrc.ug/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2014). 
 193.  For example, Justice Ben Kioko, a judge on the African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, was previously the Legal Counsel at the African Union Commission, where he was responsible 
for establishing the legal framework for the regional economic communities’ relationship to the African 
Union.  AFRICAN COMM’N ON HUMAN & PEOPLE’S RIGHTS, AGENDA OF THE SPECIAL 52ND ORDINARY 
SESSION IN COMMEMORATION OF THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN 
AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS 19 (Oct. 9–22, 2012), available at http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/52nd/ 
info/agenda/session_agenda_eng.pdf.  Justice James Ogoola from Uganda serves on the Appellate 
Division of the East African Court of Justice and the COMESA Court of Justice and was a judge in 
Uganda.  Current, COMESA CT. JUSTICE, http://comesacourt.org/en/judges/current/ (last visited May 
18, 2014); Judges, E. AFR. CT. JUSTICE, http://eacj.org/?page_id=1135 (last visited May 18, 2014).  The 
first EAC National Human Rights Institutions meeting was hosted by the EAC in February 2008.  Press 
Release, E. African Cmty., EAC Strengthens Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (Feb. 14, 
2008), available at http://appablog.wordpress.com/2008/02/15/eac-strengthens-promotion-and-
protection-of-human-rights/. 
 194.  See The Open Society Initiative for Eastern Africa, E. AFR. CIV. SOC’Y ORGS. F., 
http://eacsof.net/osiea.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2014) (describing the funding available to support local 
and regional groups in East Africa working to advance democratic governance and public 
accountability, challenge corruption, and strengthen free media). 
 195.  Mr. Donald Deya, CENTRE FOR CITIZENS’ PARTICIPATION ON AFR. UNION, 
http://ccpau.org/?page_id=501 (last visited June 21, 2014); see Lusekelo Philemon, EACJ Jurisdiction 
“Should Cover Investment Litigation,” GUARDIAN, Feb. 2, 2014, available at 
http://www.ippmedia.com/frontend/?l=64357 (noting that EALS has 15,000 individual members). 
 196.  Mr. Donald Deya, supra note 195; Frank Khachina Matanga, Civil Society and Politics in 
Africa: The Case of Kenya 14, 28, 30 (paper presented at the Fourth International Conference of ISTR, 
Dublin, Ir., July 5–8, 2000), available at http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.istr.org/resource/resmgr/ 
working_papers_dublin/matanga.pdf (discussing the efforts of the two LSK chairs to democratize 
Kenya during the heyday of one-party rule). 
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Society was involved in defending unpopular political clients before 
corrupt courts that had often happily acquiesced to the government.197  LSK 
was led by progressive lawyers who sought to change the political system, 
including the Kenyan judiciary.198  It established a vast network of 
progressive civil society groups, churches, and labor unions, among 
others.199  In addition to litigation pressing for political accountability and 
an end to one-party politics, LSK was involved in civic education, 
organizing and lobbying for policy change, attending conferences, and 
holding press conferences to push its agenda.200 
Deya took advantage of this experience when he helped to found 
EALS, where he attempted to replicate LSK’s successes.  EALS would 
become a leading litigator in the EACJ.  EALS and its corporate members, 
the Law Societies of Kenya, Tanganyika, and Uganda, filed amici briefs in 
the Mwatela and Nyong’o cases.201  EALS has been crucial in facilitating 
the civil society network that has supported broadening the East African 
integration agenda from trade and economic issues to human rights 
litigation before the court. 
One of EALS’s primary mandates is public interest advocacy.202  This 
 
 197.  ROBERT M. PRESS, PEACEFUL RESISTANCE: ADVANCING HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATIC 
FREEDOMS 83 (2006).  Donald Deya was also Deputy Chief Executive Officer and Head of 
Programmes at the Kenya Section of the International Court of Justice, another very active human 
rights civil society group in Kenya.  Mr. Donald Deya, supra note 195.  For a very similar example of 
the domestic growth of a human rights advocacy movement, see Kathryn Sikkink, From Pariah State to 
Global Protagonist: Argentina and the Struggle for International Human Rights, 50 LATIN AM. POL. & 
SOC’Y 1, 15–17 (2008).  Argentine groups were able to organize effectively because “they had 
organizational, financial, social, and cultural resources to draw on that were not available to activists in 
all countries that suffered extreme human rights violations.”  Id. at 19. 
 198.  See AFRICA WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, KENYA: POLITICAL CRACKDOWN INTENSIFIES 
(1990), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/k/kenya/kenya905.pdf (discussing President Moi’s 
repression of lawyers such as Paul Muite and Muite’s leadership of the LSK against that repression). 
 199.  PRESS, supra note 197, at 108, 123 (discussing the coalition of groups that sought to 
institutionalize opposition to authoritarian governance in Kenya). 
 200.  Stanley D. Ross, The Rule of Law and Lawyers in Kenya, 30 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 421, 435–38 
(1992); see also WILLY MUTUNGA, CONSTITUTION-MAKING FROM THE MIDDLE: CIVIL SOCIETY AND 
TRANSITION POLITICS IN KENYA, 1992–1997 (1999) (discussing the various strategies used by civil 
society groups seeking democratization and promotion of human rights in Kenya). 
 201.  Nyong’o v. Attorney Gen. of Kenya (Nyong’o III), Ref. No. 1 of 2006, at 9 (Mar. 30, 2007), 
available at http://eacj.huriweb.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/EACJ_Reference_No_1_2006.pdf; 
Mwatela v E. African Cmty., Appl. No. 1 of 2005, at 5 (Oct. 2006), available at 
http://eacj.huriweb.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/EACJ_reference_No1_2005.pdf; Deya, supra note 
96 (“In a bold stroke, the Court ruled that it is in the interests of justice that EALS be allowed as 
impartial Amicus Curiae . . . .”); Interview with Donald Deya, Chief Exec. Officer, Pan African 
Lawyers Union, in Arusha, Tanz. (Oct. 2012) (discussing EALS’s appearance as amicus curiae in 
Nyong’o). 
 202.  Under its public interest advocacy programs, EALS seeks to leverage “its human and 
intellectual resources [to] promote the common good of the people of the region through targeted 
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includes public interest litigation that seeks “judicial re-affirmation” of the 
obligation of East African states to promote and protect human rights.203  In 
2010, EALS convened a Colloquium of Legal Scholars on Litigation 
Strategies before the EACJ and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, which was attended by judges from national courts and regional 
tribunals (including the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights), as 
well as lawyers from East and Southern Africa.204  Among the outcomes 
from this meeting were offers for technical support from individual lawyers 
and EALS, both of whom have expertise complying with the legal rules of 
these courts, and offers to file three cases in 2011.205  These cases were 
Reference No. 1 of 2011 against the EAC Secretary-General, “challenging 
certain provisions in the Common Market Protocol and Customs Union 
Protocol that purport to oust the jurisdiction of the EACJ as granted by the 
EAC Treaty”; Reference No. 2 of 2011 against the Attorney General of 
Uganda and the EAC Secretary-General, “relating to the Human Rights 
Violations in Uganda during the walk to work processions”; and Reference 
No. 3 against the Attorneys General of Uganda and Kenya and the EAC 
Secretary-General “relating to the rendition of Kenyan Citizens to 
Uganda.”206  At the end of October 2012, the Pan African Lawyers Union, 
in conjunction with the East African Civil Society Organizations’ Forum 
(EACSOF) and the Open Society Initiative for East Africa, organized a 
consultation to facilitate a common position among civil society groups on 
the extension of the court’s jurisdiction, which was one of the goals agreed 
on at the Colloquium.207  EALS has also promoted the rule of law and 
human rights through other strategies, such as courtesy calls to key EAC 
officials, including the Office of Legal Council and the Secretary-General, 
and meetings with top EAC decision-makers, such as the president of 
Tanzania.208 
EALS has, in effect, marshaled a coalition of key stakeholders among 
 
interventions on the issue of the public interest, particularly on the rule of law, democracy, respect for 
human and peoples’ rights and peace building.”  Public Interest Advocacy, supra note 75. 
 203.  Id. 
 204.  E. AFRICA LAW SOC’Y, ANNUAL REPORT: NOVEMBER 2010–NOVEMBER 2011, at 14 (2011), 
available at http://www.ealawsociety.org/images/publications/annual_report/annual_report_2011.pdf. 
 205.  Id.  Following the Colloquium of Scholars conference, EALS’s Human Rights and Strategic 
Litigation Committee and its Regional Integration and International Relations Committee met to 
approve the institution of the cases.  Id. 
 206.  Id. at 15. 
 207.  CSOs Discuss Extension of the Jurisdiction of the East African Court of Justice, PAN AFR. 
LAW. UNION NEWSL. (Pan African Lawyers Union, Arusha, Tanz.), Sept.–Oct. 2012, at 3–4, available 
at http://lawyersofafrica.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/PALU-Newsletter-6-September-andOctober. 
pdf. 
 208.  E. AFRICA LAW SOC’Y, supra note 204, at 19, 21–22. 
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organizations and professionals from a variety of backgrounds who support 
human rights, democracy, and the rule of law as central ideals of the 
regional integration process.209  This coalition, which extends to national 
human rights commissions, national parliaments, and law reform 
commissions,210 has been critical to building the demand for human rights 
litigation in the EACJ and subsequently defending the legitimacy of the 
court’s human rights jurisprudence.211 
EALS, the East African Civil Society Forum, and Kituo Cha Katiba 
have run a variety of programs over the years, including conferences, 
formal and informal consultations, and capacity-building initiatives for 
 
 209.  See generally Byenkya Tito, The Role of Bar Associations in Promoting Good Governance 
and Enhancing Access to Justice, E. AFR. LAW., June 2011, at 4, available at 
http://www.ealawsociety.org/images/publications/magazines/lawyer_mag_issue_17.pdf (discussing the 
importance of such networks of professionals in the regional human rights and justice sector).  Among 
these groups are Kituo Cha Katiba: the East African Centre for Constitutional Development, the East 
Africa Human Rights Network, the East African University Academic Network, the East African 
Women Parliamentary Union, the East African Magistrates and Judges Association, the Coalition for an 
Effective African Court, and the East African NGO Council.  Interview with Donald Deya, Chief Exec. 
Officer, Pan African Lawyers Union, in Arusha, Tanz. (Oct. 2012).  As noted above, EALS is probably 
the most significant of these groups in terms of the court’s work and plays host to the East Africa Good 
Governance and Human Rights Platform, a coalition of human rights and good governance civil society 
groups in East Africa.  Id.  This coalescence has been facilitated by the location in Arusha, Tanzania, of 
the temporary headquarters of the court and the headquarters of the EAC and other human rights and 
international law-oriented groups.  African Union [AU], Decision on the Establishment of an African 
Institute of International Law in Arusha, the United Republic of Tanzania, 18th Ordinary Sess., Doc. 
Assembly/AU/14 (XVIII) Add.5 (Jan. 29–30, 2012).  Arusha has been flush with donor funding for this 
reason.  Interview with EACJ Appellate Judge and President in Arusha, Tanz. (July 30, 2013); 
Interview with EACJ Principal Judge of the First Instance Division in Arusha, Tanz. (July 30, 2013). 
 210.  Interview with Donald Deya, Chief Exec. Officer, Pan African Lawyers Union, in Arusha, 
Tanz. (Oct. 2012). 
 211.  These civil society groups have supported the broadening of the EAC’s integration agenda to 
include human rights and governance issues and have engaged in activities such as election monitoring 
in each of the EAC member states and monitoring and challenging human rights violations in the 
region.  E. AFRICAN CIVIL SOC’Y ORGS. FORUM, THE 6TH ANNUAL EACSO FORUM: THEME: 
“STRENGTHENING THEMATIC FOCUS IN THE EAST AFRICAN INTEGRATION PROCESS” 10 (2012); REPORT 
OF THE CONSULTATIVE ROUNDTABLE ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AT THE EAST AFRICAN COURT OF 
JUSTICE 2 (2012) (on file with the Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law); EAC Partner 
States Urged to Do More to Uphold People’s Rights, E. AFR. COMMUNITY (Jan. 23, 2012), 
http://www.eac.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=892:eac-partner-states-urged-to-
do-more&catid=146:press-releases&Itemid=194; Francis Ayieko, EAC Receives Proposed Regional 
Bill of Rights, E. AFR. (Oct. 23, 2007), available at http://www.afrimap.org/newsarticle.php?id=1045; 
E. AFR. GOOD GOVERNANCE & HUM. RTS. PLATFORM, http://www.gghrp.org/ (last visited June 21, 
2014).  They successfully lobbied for the formulation of the EAC’s Draft Protocol on Good 
Governance, the East African Human Rights Strategy of 2008, and the Draft East African Bill of 
Human and Peoples Rights.  Working with Partners in EAC Integration: The Perspectives of the EA 
Good Governance and Human Rights Platform, E. AFR. GOOD GOVERNANCE & HUM. RTS. PLATFORM, 
http://www.gghrp.org/working-with-partners-in-eac-integration-the-perspectives-of-the-ea-good-
governance-and-human-rights-platform (last visited Jan. 28, 2014) [hereinafter Working with Partners 
in EAC Integration]. 
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judges and staff members, to promote the use of the EACJ as a human 
rights court.212  These institutions have prompted the Council to direct the 
EAC Secretariat to formulate a framework for the EAC’s engagement with 
civil society.213  EALS has obtained observer status in the EAC and has 
been invited to Council meetings.214 
The conferences that these civil society groups have hosted215 have 
begun making the legal case for including human rights as a central part of 
regional integration.  They have looked to the fundamental and operational 
principles of the Treaty, which include adherence to principles of 
democracy, the rule of law, accountability, transparency, social justice, 
equal opportunities, and gender equality, as well as the recognition, 
promotion, and protection of human and peoples’ rights in accordance with 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.216  For these groups, 
this treaty language was not a dead letter; member states were required to 
comply with these ideals as a central objective of East African regional 
integration.217 
Ultimately, the organizational efforts of the judges and the registrar is 
an important explanation for the rise of the court’s human rights case 
law.218  In addition, lawyers and lawyer associations in East Africa have 
 
 212.  See E. AFRICAN CIVIL SOC’Y. FORUM, REPORT OF FIRST ANNUAL EAST AFRICAN CIVIL 
SOCIETY FORUM: AGENDA SETTING: THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY 
(2006), available at http://eacsof.net/upload/REPORTS/THE%20REPORT%20ON%20THE%20 
1ST%20ANNUAL%20E.%20A%20CSO%20FORUM.pdf (discussing the activities of the East African 
Civil Society Forum); Donald Deya, Constitutionalism and the East African Community in 2004, in 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN EAST AFRICA: PROGRESS, CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS IN 2004, at 79, 92, 
available at http://www.kituochakatiba.org/sites/default/files/publications/Constitutionalism%20in%20 
East%20Africa%202004.pdf (noting that several civil society groups “undertook research, publication, 
training and dialogue activities for their members, stakeholders and/or the public at large; lobbied or 
engaged in advocacy with the national and regional governments; and also engaged in networking with 
each other, with other East Africans and sometimes with stakeholders further afield.”). 
 213.  KITUO CHA KATIBA: E. AFR. CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL DEV., supra note 16, at 7. 
 214.  Interview with Donald Deya, Chief Exec. Officer, Pan African Lawyers Union, in Arusha, 
Tanz. (Oct. 2012); Working With Partners in EAC Integration, supra note 211.  Council meetings 
are often planned at the last minute, and there is often little prior notice given to EALS so that it can 
secure attendance of one of its officers.  Interview with Donald Deya, Chief Exec. Officer, Pan African 
Lawyers Union, in Arusha, Tanz. (Oct. 2012). 
 215.  See, e.g., E. AFRICA LAW SOC’Y,  supra note 204, at 1, 14–15, 19–20, 22. 
 216.  Interview with Donald Deya, Chief Exec. Officer, Pan African Lawyers Union, in Arusha, 
Tanz. (Oct. 2012); Interview with Donald Deya, Chief Exec. Officer, Pan African Lawyers Union, in 
Arusha, Tanz. (May 2011). 
 217.  Deya, supra note 96. 
 218.  For a similar account of the role of lawyer associations in the early life of the European 
Communities, see KAREN J. ALTER, Jurist Advocacy Movements in Europe: The Role of Euro-Law 
Associations in European Integration (1953–1975), in THE EUROPEAN COURT’S POLITICAL POWER: 
SELECTED ESSAYS 63 (discussing jurist advocacy movements in the evolution of the European 
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mobilized to encourage the court to decide human rights cases.  The 
mutually supportive relationship between these groups and the court has 
been critical to successfully overcoming the court’s limited jurisdiction and 
institutional weaknesses. 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE EACJ’S EXPERIENCE FOR THEORIES 
OF DELEGATION 
This Part considers the ways in which the EACJ’s experience relates 
to contemporary theories of delegation, which seek to explain why states 
delegate to international courts (ICs), in an attempt to show how they 
explain the court’s human rights jurisprudence.219  Specifically, it examines 
five approaches: (1) Principal-Agent Theory, (2) International Courts as 
Trustees, (3) the Altered Politics Framework, (4) Constrained 
Independence Theory, and (5) Bounded Discretion Theory.  Ultimately, 
these theories are largely inadequate in the East African context.  As such, 
it is important to develop more relevant and applicable frameworks to 
account for delegation to international courts in Africa. 
A. Principal-Agent Theory 
Under Principal Agent (P-A) theory, the Agent is under the control of 
the Principal.220  As such the Principal can fire the Agent or rewrite the 
contract between the parties.221  In the context of ICs, states, as appointing 
authorities, are the Principals, while judges are the Agents.  According to 
P-A theorists of dependent international adjudication, states address agency 
slack, or the propensity of judges to overstep their authority, by appointing 
dependent tribunals when a dispute arises.222  As such, dependent tribunals 
are more vulnerable to states and are more likely to decide cases before 
them in ways that reflect the interests of the appointing state at the time of 
appointment.223 
 
Community legal order). 
 219.  Darren G. Hawkins et al., Delegation Under Anarchy: States, International Organizations, 
and Principal-Agent Theory, in DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 1 
(Darren G. Hawkins et al. eds., 2006). 
 220.  See Alter, supra note 67, at 34 (“A number of scholars have used the ideas of Principal–Agent 
theory (P–A) to argue that states are actually controlling what merely appear to be independent 
International Courts.”); cf. MARK A. POLLACK, THE ENGINES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: 
DELEGATION, AGENCY, AND AGENDA SETTING IN THE EU (2003) (using P-A theory to explain the 
evolution of European integration). 
 221.  Alter, supra note 67, at 34. 
 222.  See Eric Posner & John Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1, 33 (2005). 
 223.  Id. at 23, 26–27. 
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The experience of the EACJ defies these assumptions.  Under P-A 
theory, the court would be expected to act consistently with the wishes of 
the Principals.224  This has hardly been the case.  The Principals in the EAC 
context have explicitly declined to extend jurisdiction over human rights to 
the court, yet the court has assumed such jurisdiction.  Under P-A theory, 
one would also expect that the EAC Principals would punish the court for 
overstepping its authority.  While EAC states have certainly expressed their 
disapproval of the court by amending the Treaty to circumscribe the court’s 
jurisdiction, EAC Principals have not suspended the court, nor has the court 
retreated from its rulings that it has jurisdiction over human rights cases. 
Furthermore, P-A theorists would have predicted that the sovereignty-
maximizing tendency among EAC states suggests that they would have 
been hesitant to create a court that they could not control.  Yet EAC states 
created the EACJ as an independent tribunal, and the risks that P-A 
theorists suggest correlate with such tribunals, including decisions that 
conflict with the interests of the appointing states and the propensity of 
such tribunals to be influenced by moral ideals or ideological imperatives, 
are absent.  In short, P-A theory does not fully account for the court’s 
growing human rights jurisprudence. 
B. ICs as Trustees 
Conceptualizing ICs as Trustees discards the view that judges are 
merely agents of their appointing authorities.  Trustees are professionals 
that bring their own legitimacy and authority to ICs.225  That reputation is 
important enough to their personal and professional identities that they may 
choose a political sanction rather than compromise it.226  When Trustees act 
on behalf of their beneficiaries, their determinations become part of the 
political process, thereby changing the “nature of the political game”227 and 
 
 224.  See KAREN J. ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: COURTS, POLITICS, 
RIGHTS 30 (2014).  Contrary to dependent PA theorists, Alter argues that ICs sometimes challenge and 
sometimes extend the power of the state.  Id.  As such, in dispute settlement and administrative review 
roles, where IC and state interests tend to be most aligned, ICs act as agents of the state.  Id. at 30–31.  
By contrast, in the roles focused more on sovereignty limitation and constitutional review, ICs act as 
Trustees.  Id. at 9–10. 
 225.  Alter, supra note 67, at 33 (“Principals choose to delegate to Trustees, as opposed to Agents, 
when the point of delegation is to harness the authority of the Trustee so as to enhance the legitimacy of 
political decision-making.  Trustees are (1) selected because of their personal reputation or professional 
norms, (2) given independent authority to make decisions according to their best judgment or 
professional criteria, and (3) empowered to act on behalf of a beneficiary.”). 
 226.  Id. at 39. 
 227.  Id. at 44 (noting that Trustees do more than merely exploit “slippage,” or the exercise of 
authority not explicitly conferred on a tribunal, which is a frequent consequence of delegation to an 
Agent). 
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“undermin[ing] state power or the interests of the powerful.”228  Ultimately, 
conceptualizing ICs as Trustees, as opposed to Agents, clarifies how ICs 
like the EACJ come to undertake “ambitious and systematic legal 
construction” that goes beyond what is specifically authorized or 
delegated.229  Seeing ICs as trustees also opens up space for additional 
actors and sources of power besides Principals and Agents to account for 
the behavior of judges on an international court or tribunal,230 focusing on 
how ICs give sub-state actors, such as civil society groups that favor 
compliance with the law, leverage over states.231 
The EACJ has adopted ambitious interpretations of the Treaty that 
partly reflect the assumptions of Trustee theory and that are consistent with 
the urging of compliance constituencies,232 such as the East Africa Law 
Society, that have utilized the court’s access rules to bring human rights 
cases.  The court has identified the people of the EAC as the beneficiaries 
of its human rights jurisprudence and ultimately of EAC integration 
treaties.  Seeing ICs as Trustees, however, is based on a set of background 
assumptions.  One of them is that an IC has the full institutional support of 
the other organs of the international institution within which the IC serves.  
For example, more often than not, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has 
had the support of the European Commission.233  This has not been the case 
in East Africa, where the court’s jurisprudence on human rights has come 
notwithstanding efforts, particularly by the Council, to deny it the authority 
 
 228.  Id.; but see id. (noting that Trustees “can also be a tool of the powerful, promoting shared 
interests and goals”). 
 229.  Id. at 34.  P-A theorists “assume that Agents automatically self-censor because they can 
rationally expect sanctions if they act in ways the Principal does not want.”  Id. at 37. 
 230.  Alter, supra note 67, at 36 (“The Trustee argument provides analytical boundaries that help 
one know when to expect Principals’ sanctioning tools to be politically significant.  It also redirects the 
analyst to look at a broader range of actors that shape Trustee behavior, showing how actors with no 
real ability to change the Trustee’s contract may nonetheless be equally influential in shaping Trustee 
politics, and thus Principal politics.”). 
 231.  ALTER, supra note 224, at 4 (“An international court’s political influence comes from its 
authority to say what the law means for the case at hand, its jurisdiction to name violations of 
international law, and its ability to specify remedies that follow from international legal violations.”); 
Alter, supra note 67, at 55 (describing Trustee politics as an environment “where internationally 
negotiated compromises can be unseated through legal interpretation, where states can come to find 
themselves constrained by principles they never agreed to, and where non-state actors have influence 
and can effectively use international law against states”). 
 232.  See ALTER, supra note 224, at 53 (defining compliance constituencies as the set of actors that 
has the power to decide whether to comply with international law). 
 233.  See Karen J. Alter and Jeannette Vargas, Explaining Variation in the Use of European 
Litigation Strategies: European Community Law and British Gender Equality Policy, 33 COMP. POL. 
STUD. 452 (2000) (discussing the European Court of Justice’s support of the European Commission’s 
agenda on gender equality). 
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to decide human rights cases and the resources to operate without having to 
worry about its long-term viability. 
There is another version of the theory of ICs as Trustees, however.  
Under this theory, states intentionally create ICs to act independently of the 
influence of their appointing states:234 as, for example, when the EAC states 
created the EACJ, which assumed jurisdiction over human rights despite 
the Treaty not extending such jurisdiction to it.  In this version of the 
theory, “courts are trustees of the values that inhere in the treaties that 
constituted them, discharging various ‘fiduciary’ duties in the service of the 
overarching objectives of the regime.”235  Three conditions must be 
satisfied under this theory for trustee courts to dominate their regimes: “(1) 
important disputes alleging noncompliance with treaty law are routinely 
brought to the court, (2) the judges produce defensible rulings, and (3) 
states treat the reasons the court gives to justify rulings as having 
precedential effect.”236  Under such conditions, judges tend to produce 
rulings that reflect what states might do under majoritarian decision 
rules.237  This helps to limit the growth of IC authority and to address IC 
legitimacy problems.238 
This version of trustee theory does not explain the EACJ’s human 
rights jurisprudence, primarily because two of its main assumptions are not 
met in East Africa.  First, disputes on noncompliance with EAC law do not 
routinely go to the court.  Unlike the ECJ and the European Court of 
Human Rights, the EACJ is a very young court, and resorting to it, even for 
human rights cases, is the exception rather than the rule.  Second, EAC 
member states have not treated the human rights case law as creating 
precedent, as indicated by their continuing challenge of the court’s 
jurisdiction over human rights. 
 
 234.  See Alter, supra note 67, at 54 (“Even where ICs lack sufficient authority to induce respect 
for their rulings, they influence the political process by providing a focal tool to organize political 
coalitions within and across states, and a legitimacy boost to actors trying to challenge arguably illegal 
state policy.”); see also Alec Stone Sweet & Thomas L. Brunell, Trustee Courts and the Judicialization 
of International Regimes: The Politics of Majoritarian Activism in the European Convention on Human 
Rights, the European Union, and the World Trade Organization, 1 J.L. & CTS. 61, 65 (2013) (“[A] 
trustee court operates in an unusually permissive zone of discretion.  The zone of discretion is 
determined by the sum of competences explicitly delegated to a court and possessed as a result of its 
own lawmaking, minus the sum of control instruments available for use by the principals to override the 
court or to curb it in other ways.”). 
 235.  Stone Sweet & Brunell, supra note 234, at 62. 
 236.  Id. at 62–63. 
 237.  Id. at 63–64. 
 238.  Id. at 64. 
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C. The Altered Politics Framework 
The altered politics framework further extends the conceptualization 
of ICs as independent actors.  Under this framework, rather than limiting 
state power, “new style” ICs—those with compulsory jurisdiction and 
access for nonstate actors—extend their own power.239  When deciding 
cases, ICs take into account litigant interests, rather than government 
preferences.240  In fact, new style ICs are likely to decide cases in which 
governments are reluctant participants.241  This theory also hypothesizes 
that ICs influence governments through the alliances that the ICs build with 
compliance constituencies.242  ICs rely on the continued support of civil 
society groups, government officials, members of administrative agencies, 
militaries, and other actors who “increase the shadow of international law 
in domestic and international politics.”243  This mobilization of litigants and 
connection to compliance constituencies, in turn, decreases the likelihood 
that states will want to continue violating international law.244 
The altered politics model “allows for circumventing elected political 
bodies and domestic judges and by substituting international legality for 
domestic legality.”245  This, in turn, increases the credibility of the 
commitments that governments make to their population, to other 
governments, and to investors.246  ICs thereby assist governments in 
adopting policies that may be domestically controversial but are consistent 
with international legal regimes.247  Four conditions are necessary for ICs 
to alter domestic and international politics: 1) litigants must be able to seize 
the court, 2) actors within states must care about legality, 3) entrepreneurs 
must invoke a court and help to build compliance constituencies, and 4) 
international rules must enjoy the political support of constituencies that 
 
 239.  ALTER, supra note 224, at 10. 
 240.  Id. 
 241.  Id. at 7. 
 242.  Id. at 19. 
 243.  Id. at 16 (“Political mobilization and the legal, symbolic, and political resources supplied 
to compliance constituencies generated costs for violating international law.”). 
 244.  Id. at 15 (“IC rulings also provided legal, symbolic, and political resources that those actors 
who preferred law compliance could use as levers for their cause.”). 
 245.  Id. at 67. 
 246.  Id. at 64–65 (“Where governments want to encourage foreign investment and where 
governments want to bolster a promise to their own population or to other states, they may happily 
submit to international judicial oversight and readily respect IC rulings to provide proof of the 
government’s commitment to the rules in question.”). 
 247.  Id. at 65 (noting that IC’s facilitate the “ability of state and nonstate actors to seek an 
international legal remedy, and thereby circumvent domestic legal and political barriers”). 
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have power.248 
The experience of the EACJ is consistent with the altered politics 
framework: compliance constituencies have used the court to advance their 
goals and achieve domestic political objectives that are unattainable 
through domestic channels.  Groups and individuals have been 
“empowered” to challenge EAC governments for deviating from the 
Treaty.249  A key element of the altered politics model is not present in the 
court, however.  International laws—particularly those that relate to human 
rights—do not enjoy the political support of constituencies that have 
power, such as EAC governments and the Council.  EAC governments 
have not strongly adhered to protecting and promoting human rights.  They 
have been reluctant to enforce human rights even within their own 
domestic courts, if not sometimes hostile to such enforcement.  This is a 
major reason why these governments have chosen not to confer human 
rights jurisdiction on the court. 
D. Constrained Independence Theory 
Under the constrained independence theory, the enhanced credibility 
that states receive for establishing tribunals that may rule against them 
outweighs the costs involved.250  ICs promote the credibility of a state’s 
international commitments “by raising the probability that violations of 
those commitments will be detected and accurately labeled as 
noncompliance.”251  The short-term material and reputational costs of such 
violations, in turn, maximizes the long-term value of the treaty 
commitments to all parties.252  States can “then use a range of more fine-
grained mechanisms to limit the potential for [judicial] overreaching.”253  
Furthermore, this theory explains “how independent tribunals can flourish 
in an international legal system in which enforcement authority resides 
predominantly in states themselves.”254 
One would expect that East African governments established an 
independent international court to decrease the likelihood that, in a region 
 
 248.  Id. at 62. 
 249.  Id. at 19 (“The existence of an international legal remedy empowers those actors who have 
international law on their side . . . .”). 
 250.  Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States Create International Tribunals: A 
Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, 93 Calif. L. Rev. 899, 904 (2005). 
 251.  Id. 
 252.  Id.  The constrained independence, P-A, and trustee theories have one commonality: that 
delegation to ICs empowers non-state actors who mobilize to use the court. 
 253.  Id. at 901. 
 254.  Id. at 931. 
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characterized by high trade barriers,255 an EAC member would defect from 
its market liberalization commitments.  That has not been the case, 
however, as the EACJ has hardly entertained any cases involving EAC 
market integration commitments.  EAC states seem to overwhelmingly 
prefer negotiations and political solutions, rather than adjudication, to 
resolve their trade disputes.256  While this preference for political 
negotiation rather than litigation may well help these states meet their 
expectations, it comes at the expense of using the dispute settlement 
process to propel the economic integration process forward.  In this sense, 
the court’s experience seems to be at odds with the view that its role is to 
enhance the credibility of EAC international commitments. 
Furthermore, one would expect that political and discursive 
constraints in East Africa, including weak judicial enforcement of human 
rights at the national level, criticism of the court’s activism by the member 
states,257 the exclusion of human rights from the court’s jurisdiction, 
noncompliance with its rulings, and threats to further restrict its 
jurisdiction, do not bode well for human rights jurisprudence at the regional 
level, yet they do not seem to have played a salient role in restricting it.  
The EACJ’s human rights jurisprudence shows that its formal attributes, 
including its ad hoc nature, the explicit exclusion of human rights from its 
jurisdiction, and the lack of formal terms of service for its judges, have not 
been a barrier to its broad constructions of the Treaty.258  The fact that these 
“informal signaling devices”259 have not substantially moderated the 
 
 255.  E. AFRICAN CMTY., THE SECOND EAC DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 2001–2005, at 12 (2001), 
available at http://www.eac.int/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=3&Itemid= 
163 (identifying non-tariff barriers as major impediments to trade in East Africa and noting that they 
can be more significant than tariffs). 
 256.  See James Thuo Gathii, The Variation in the Use of Sub-regional Courts Between Business 
and Human Rights Actors: The Case of the East African Court of Justice, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
(forthcoming 2014) (discussing this preference).  Thus the EACJ was not given jurisdiction over the 
Customs Union and Common Market Protocols.  The Common Market Protocol gave a quasi-
administrative agency the power to determine any disputes under the Protocol.  Cf. Helfer & Slaughter, 
supra note 250, at 940 (“Diplomatic negotiations, threats of tit-for-tat reciprocity, reprisals, and other 
self-help measures are standard modes of interaction in bilateral settings.”). 
 257.  Cf. id. at 952 (identifying criticisms of a tribunal’s rulings as an example of a political ex post 
control mechanism, even where the decision is purely hortatory). 
 258.  Cf. id. at 945 (“Precision in drafting commitments is perhaps the most obvious formal control 
mechanism that states can exercise [on international tribunals] ex ante.  Clearly defined substantive 
rules impose real constraints on tribunals and the parties that wish to use them.  They encourage early 
settlement of disputes, and they inhibit the creation of expansive jurisprudence by requiring judges to 
provide a persuasive justification for departing from a shared textual meaning.”); Posner & Yoo, supra 
note 222, at 9 (arguing that the formal attributes of a tribunal, such as its permanence, compulsory 
jurisdiction, and judge tenure, are important for tribunal independence). 
 259.  Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 250, at 930. 
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court’s human rights jurisprudence indicates the court’s relatively high 
level of independence. 
This raises a number of questions, however.  What explains this level 
of independence?  Has the court’s human rights jurisprudence enhanced the 
credibility of the court rather than of the states?  Why has it invoked 
teleological or purposive techniques to highlight and promote the 
protection of human rights, the rule of law, and good governance, which 
are identified as broad goals of the EAC, while ignoring the textual and 
informal restrictions of its jurisdiction over human rights cases?  Under 
what circumstances is it likely that the judges will feel constrained, 
formally or informally, not to transgress the limitations imposed by the 
Treaty?   
The EACJ’s human rights case law is now part of a broader 
transnational jurisprudence.  There is no doubt that the expansion, through 
“justice cascades,”260 of accountability principles for violations of human 
rights has reached East Africa, as human rights NGOs and activists have 
increasingly resorted to using the court for remedies that they could not get 
in their national courts.  That EACJ judges see themselves as embedded 
within a larger set of international courts, connected by the types of cases 
and issues that come before them, is demonstrated by their citation to cases 
from other international courts.261  As predicted by the constrained 
independence theory, this jurisprudence helps to set the internal boundaries 
that IC judges use to limit their own authority and to retain their 
reputations.262 
E. Bounded Discretion Theory 
Under the bounded discretion theory, a state will not delegate to ICs 
unless they serve the state’s interests.263  Furthermore, explicit and implicit 
 
 260.  See KATHRYN SIKKINK, THE JUSTICE CASCADE: HOW HUMAN RIGHTS PROSECUTIONS ARE 
CHANGING WORLD POLITICS 4–5 (2011) (describing the emergence of individual accountability 
mechanisms in the twentieth century). 
 261.  The EACJ has often cited the European Court of Justice.  See, e.g., E. African Centre for 
Trade Policy & Law v. Sec’y Gen. of the E. African Cmty., Ref. No. 9 of 2012, at 28 (First Instance 
Div. May 9, 2013), available at http://eacj.huriweb.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/FI_ 
EACommunity-EACTPL.pdf (citing Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585, 594) (noting that the 
Treaty requires partner states to “ensure uniform interpretation and avoid conflicting decisions and 
uncertainty in the interpretation of the Treaty”); see also van der Mei, supra note 81, at 420 (arguing 
that the EACJ has drawn inspiration from the case law of the European Court of Justice). 
 262.  Cf. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 250, at 953 (arguing that this self-restraint is part of the 
theory of constrained independence). 
 263.  Tom Ginsburg, Bounded Discretion in International Judicial Lawmaking, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 
631, 632 (2005). 
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strategic constraints, including control over appointments and budgets264 
and the fact that judges internalize “a limited conception of their 
lawmaking role,” limit judicial discretion.265  IC judges may internalize 
passivity or employ strategies, such as dismissing cases for being 
nonjusticiable, that avoid displeasing their appointing authorities.266  
Therefore, IC judges have limited lawmaking power.  These limits are 
crucial to the willingness of states to delegate to ICs.267  As most people 
share an “abhorrence of retroactive law,” a judge’s ability to go beyond the 
written law to answer a legal question is limited, since to do so would be 
rewrite the rules.268  These constraints explain why states delegate to ICs, 
since they would otherwise “be reluctant to delegate any authority to 
dispute resolvers when judges resist political control.”269  States thus create 
vague treaties and establish ICs as part of “an explicit strategy . . . to help 
them coordinate their behavior long after the ink has dried on the 
agreement.”270 
Bounded discretion does not fit the EACJ human rights jurisprudence.  
Since the Council has explicitly declined to extend such jurisdiction to the 
court, the court’s human rights jurisprudence is an anomaly given the 
assumption in this theory that states leave treaties vague with a view to 
having ICs coordinate state behavior.  By arguing that it has implicit 
jurisdiction over cases involving human rights by virtue of references to 
human rights, the rule of law, and good governance in the operational and 
fundamental principles clauses of the Treaty, the court’s experience is at 
odds with the theory of bounded discretion.271 
F. How the EACJ Defies IC Theories 
International courts have been created with increasing frequency 
outside of Europe and North America as regional trade pacts around the 
 
 264.  Id. at 665. 
 265.  Id. at 668; see also Manfred Elsig & Mark A. Pollack, Agents, Trustees and International 
Courts: The Politics of Judicial Appointment at the World Trade Organization, EUR. J. INT’L REL. 3–4 
(Sept. 5, 2012) (discussing control over the appointment of members of the WTO Appellate Body as 
WTO Members have become more concerned with Appellate Body activism). 
 266.  Ginsburg, supra note 263, at 660 n.110. 
 267.  Id. at 644 (concluding that states are more likely to delegate to ICs “when the expected policy 
losses resulting from the agency problem are outweighed by the joint benefits to the parties from 
enhanced coordination”). 
 268.  Id. at 635. 
 269.  Id. at 663. 
 270.  Id. at 673; see also id. at 641 (“At the international level, the residual lawmaking capacity of 
judges may well be part of the intended design of the treaty regime.”). 
 271.  Judicial lawmaking is least effective when it is nonconsensual.  Id. at 641. 
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world have continued to proliferate.272  Africa has not been left behind. 
Theories accounting for the spread of ICs, however, only partially 
account for the experience of the EACJ.  A key assumption of these 
theories is that governments establish ICs to signal the credibility of their 
commitments to each other and/or to third parties.  That is perhaps why the 
ECJ’s judicial activism did not provoke the ire of other European 
Commission institutions but rather retained their confidence.273  Unlike in 
the ECJ, whose decisions have largely aligned with the European 
Commission’s preferences,274 the EACJ’s human rights decisions have not 
closely conformed to the desires of the Council.  Thus the assumption that 
the court was established to signal EAC state commitment to the Treaty 
may not necessarily be true.275  This is further buttressed by the Council’s 
refusal to explicitly grant the court jurisdiction over human rights.  Thus, 
under these theories the growing human rights jurisprudence of the EACJ is 
an anomaly.  It seems that the court is leading EAC states towards meeting 
the commitments they have made. 
Thus, this Article has demonstrated that these theories do not provide 
much guidance for understanding what has happened in East Africa.  One 
would expect, under existing theories on IC delegation, that the constituent 
states would simply pull the rug from under the court’s feet: for example, 
by disbanding the court.276  A key component of the court’s human rights 
jurisdiction, however, has been its ability to carve out its autonomy and 
independence, defying both other EAC organs, such as the Council, and 
EAC member states.277 
 
 272.  See generally James Thuo Gathii, The Neoliberal Turn in Regional Trade Agreements, 86 
WASH. L. REV. 421 (2011) (discussing the spread of regional trade pacts); ALTER, supra note 224, at 
116–18, 143–54 (2014) (discussing the proliferation of international courts around the world after the 
end of the cold war). 
 273.  See Koen Lenaerts, Some Thoughts About the Interaction Between Judges and Politicians, 
1992 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 93, 111 (1992) (asserting that European politicians had not “lost confidence” in 
the ECJ when they decided to pursue European integration through legislation rather than judicial 
decisions). 
 274.  Stone Sweet & Brunell, supra note 234, at 71. 
 275.  However, one explanation consistent with this assumption is that disbanding the EACJ would 
send inappropriate signals to EAC trade partners such as the European Union.  The assumption here is 
that the EAC was formed, like the EU, as a signal to third parties that EAC states are committed to 
market liberalization.  See GATHII, supra note 1, at 24–27 (2011) (showing that African regional trade 
agreements have multiple objectives, including trade liberalization).  That assumption is simply that: an 
assumption. 
 276.  Thus Posner & Yoo would argue that, as in the case of a dependent tribunal, the EACJ would 
be subject to EAC control through threats of reappointment and retaliation.  See Posner & Yoo, supra 
note 222, at 14 (discussing state strategies for controlling dependent tribunals). 
 277.  Cf. Shannon Smithey, Strategic Activism: A Comparative View of Judges as Institution 
Builders 4 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Duke Journal of Comparative and International 
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While the EACJ may behave like ICs in other regions, particularly in 
terms of its broad construction of the Treaty, the context in East Africa is 
very different.  East Africa has no history of judicial activism, and national 
judiciaries in general have been very passive.  There are simply no 
examples of judicial power operating independently of governments.  For 
the court to have been as active as it has been is a remarkable achievement, 
rather than a general pattern of courts in the region.  Rather than extending 
the power of EAC states, as the altered framework theory argues that ICs 
do, the court has come to be regarded by EAC states as a check on their 
sovereignty because they perceive the court’s rulings that the Treaty 
requires member states to comply with the rule of law, good governance, 
and human rights as strengthening the authority of regional and human 
rights law over national law and as a result strengthening the EAC over its 
members. 
Establishing democratic legitimacy for the EACJ when it adjudicates 
issues that are viewed as exclusively within each country’s sovereign 
control is therefore a major concern.  This issue is closely linked with 
questions of ensuring democratic control of competences delegated to 
international institutions, such as courts.  This question is not uniquely 
African,278 but it is particularly relevant in the African context because of 
the special attachment to sovereignty that African countries often exhibit.279 
Yet, notwithstanding this strong attachment to sovereignty in Africa, 
the story of the EACJ’s human rights jurisprudence is about the ways in 
which the court has definitively established its autonomy from the EAC 
political organs and member states, in which the court has pushed back 
against attempts to establish hierarchical relations among EAC organs that 
would allow the Council to commandeer the roles of the EACJ and the 
EALA at will.  In so doing, the court has been able to preserve for itself a 
significant amount of discretion in judicial decision-making that surpasses 
 
Law) (discussing the role that judges assume in the protection of their own institutional authority). 
 278.  For a European perspective, see Peter L. Lindseth, Democratic Legitimacy and the 
Administrative Character of Supranationalism: The Example of the European Community, 99 COLUM. 
L. REV. 628, 643 (1999) (“[T]he key obstacle to supranational legitimacy is the difficulty in 
reproducing democratically-legitimate, hierarchical control outside the confines of the nation-state.”).  
Supranational legitimacy has been justified by criteria such as “technocratic assertions of efficiency and 
expertise,” transparency, and participation.  Id. at 634 (proposing that the best way to think of the EU’s 
legitimacy is by analogizing it to the modern administrative state rather than to the nation-state, which 
derives its legitimacy from the people). 
 279.  See Stanlake JTM Samkrange, African Perspectives on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 11 
AFR. SECURITY REV. 73 (2002) (“[T]he exploitation and degradation that resulted from African 
societies losing sovereignty and control to a foreign colonial entity, has prompted post-colonial states in 
Africa to be fiercely attached to international rights, protections and the recognition of that regained 
sovereignty.”). 
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that of national judges of EAC member states.  Instead of internalizing a 
restrictive understanding of their roles, as national judges in EAC member 
states often do, EACJ judges have pushed the boundaries.  In doing so, they 
may have begun drawing the contours of judicial supremacy in the EAC.  
For now though, the Council prefers political negotiations as the driver of 
the integration process. 
CONCLUSION 
Rather than remain faithful to its lack of jurisdiction to decide human 
rights cases, the East African Court of Justice has deployed an elastic 
interpretive methodology that has allowed it to push the textual boundaries 
of its jurisdiction.  This teleological or purposive methodology has 
emphasized the EAC Treaty’s broad aims with respect to human rights, the 
rule of law, democracy, and good governance, while underemphasizing the 
textual limitations of the court’s mandate.280  In doing so, the court has 
failed to closely track the positions of EAC member states, particularly 
insofar as these states have specifically decided not to extend jurisdiction 
over cases involving human rights to the court.281  By deciding that it has 
such jurisdiction, the court has engaged in expansive judicial policymaking.  
This is all the more remarkable because EAC states have seldom sought to 
debate their economic integration goals in the language and logic of law, 
much less of human rights law.282  Only once, when political negotiations 
on the common market were at a near impasse, did the EAC States resort to 
the court, and there they sought an advisory opinion.283 
This paper has sought to account for the EACJ’s activism.  In 
particular, why did EAC states risk delegating jurisdiction over the 
interpretation of the Treaty to the court?  Did they expect that the court 
 
 280.  This has been similar to the experience of the ECJ.  See Anne-Marie Burley & Walter Mattli, 
Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration, 47 INT’L ORG. 41, 68 (1993) 
(arguing that the European Court of Justice used the “teleological method of interpretation” to justify its 
decisions in light of the common interests of the EC members that were enshrined in both the specific 
and general objectives of the Rome Treaty). 
 281.  This is also similar to the experience of the ECJ.  See id. at 51. 
 282.  By contrast, the ECJ’s human rights case law bolstered its authority to develop a uniform 
community law and its authority over recalcitrant national courts that did not want to give up their 
authority to decide whether claims based on EC law were consistent with domestic constitutions.  See 
Anne-Marie Burley, Democracy and Judicial Review in the European Community, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 81, 87 (1992) (“Human rights review bolstered the ECJ against rebellious national courts claiming 
the necessity and exclusive power to review claims that Community actions violated the human rights 
provisions in their national constitutions.”). 
 283.  See In re a Request by the Council of Ministers of the E. African Cmty. for an Advisory Op., 
Appl. No. 1 of 2008 (First Instance Div. 2009), available at http://eacj.huriweb.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2012/11/advisory_opinion_1_of_2008.pdf. 
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would be faithful to the restrictions on its jurisdiction?  Why did they fail to 
control appointments to the court, to prevent the possibility of a runaway 
court, in the same way that they have done domestically?  Why did they 
fail to require the publication of the judges’ votes in individual cases?  And 
why have they not engaged in disbanding the court in the same way that 
member states of the SADC Tribunal did? 
In answering these questions, this Article has borne in mind that in the 
early period of the ECJ, the six original EC members often objected to the 
court’s power to interpret their respective national laws and to hold that 
certain conduct was inconsistent with EC law.284  Rather than weighing the 
costs and benefits of compromising the sovereignty of member states as a 
result of the expansion of EC law, the ECJ asserted that law’s full 
effectiveness.285  The EACJ’s expansive jurisprudence has been similarly 
resisted by member states. 
This paper tested the EACJ’s expansive human rights jurisprudence 
against six contemporary theories that seek to explain delegation to 
international courts.  None of these theories fits the East African 
experience. 
The EACJ’s activism is the culmination of three influences.  First, it is 
a reflection of the determined efforts of the judges to make the court 
relevant and accessible to East Africans, who built the EACJ’s role in the 
integration process through innumerable formal and informal contacts with 
lawyers, civil society groups, and governmental agencies of EAC member 
States, among other groups.286  Second, by developing human rights case 
law, the judges have created a regional avenue in which East Africans can 
seek judicial confirmations of violations of human rights, the rule of law, 
and good governance, despite the reluctance of national judiciaries to 
enforce human rights and the lack of confidence in the court among 
national representative institutions.  The court is now regarded as a 
 
 284.  Lenaerts, supra note 273, at 98–99. 
 285.  Id. at 101 (“[A]ny ‘impediment to the full effectiveness of Community law’ had to be 
rejected . . . .  [T]he ECJ is not ready to engage in a balancing test, weighing the effectiveness of 
Community law against the possible cost in terms of national resentment toward the ECJ’s ruling.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 286.  The judges have acknowledged the value of a regional body that can opine on states’ 
compliance with international law, even if that court has no enforcement power.  See Sebalu v. Sec’y 
Gen. of the E. African Cmty., Ref. No. 1 of 2010, at 41 (First Instance Div. Jun. 30, 2011), available at 
http://eacj.huriweb.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/No-1-of-2010.pdf (“The EACJ is a legitimate 
avenue through which to seek redress, even if all the Court does is to make declarations of illegality of 
the impugned acts, whether of commission or omission.  It would be well to remember that the court is 
a primary avenue through which the people can secure not only proper interpretation and application of 
the Treaty but also effective and expeditious compliance therewith.”). 
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valuable contribution to the EAC’s integration process.287  This case law 
has dovetailed very well with anti-impunity movements in East Africa and 
has laid a strong foundation for the court’s legitimacy.  Third, and as a 
result, the court has developed a strong reputation within multiple networks 
of civil society, professional, and other groups at the national and regional 
levels as a defender of human rights, the rule of law, and good governance.  
In effect, these groups have served as an insurance mechanism against 
extensive reductions in or suspensions of the court’s jurisdiction.  They 
have also provided a continuing stream of cases that have demonstrated 
that there is a demand for the court’s human rights case law. 
Ultimately, human rights litigation in the EACJ is part of a broader 
strategy of political mobilization that is giving voice to actors who did not 
have such legal recourse to advance their claims in the past.  This 
mobilization is particularly important because discredited political 
institutions—parties, legislatures, and executives—are not regarded as 
avenues for addressing the concerns of ordinary citizens in their own 
national jurisdictions at the moment. 
 
 287.  In his 2013 New Year Message, the EAC Secretary General congratulated the EACJ for 
opening registries in EAC member states and thereby bringing justice closer to the people.  Richard 
Sezibera, Sec’y Gen., E. African Cmty., New Year Message (Dec. 31, 2013), available at 
http://eac.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1455:amb-dr-richard-seziberas-new-
year-message-&catid=146:press-releases&Itemid=194 
